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The combination of black beans, fraud and Chicago and
New York banks has had a destabilizing effect on contemporary
letter of credit law.1 The latest destabilization involves the un-
availability of injunctions against payment to a possibly fraudu-
lent letter of credit beneficiary.2 All too often courts have
granted injunctions where they are not warranted and, by so do-
ing, have frustrated good faith beneficiaries' reasonable expecta-
* 921 F.2d 32 (2d Cir. 1990).
** 64 N.Y.2d 287, 475 N.E.2d 1255, 486 N.Y.S.2d 715 (1985).
United States Representative to the International Chamber of Commerce
Working Party for the Revision of Uniform Customs and Practices; United States Dele-
gate to the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law Contract Practices
(Bank Guarantees); Professor of Law at the University of Arizona, College of Law, on
leave as Director and President of the National Law Center for Inter-American Free
Trade. The author wishes to express his appreciation to Profezor James Byme and
James Barnes, Esq. for their helpful comments and suggestions and to Billie Kozolchyk
for her fine editorial assistance. As customary, the author remains responsible for errors
or inaccuracies. The Brooklyn Law Review has relied on the author for the translation,
citation style and substance of many of the foreign sources used in this Article.
I Almost a decade ago, Milton Shadur, one of our most thoughtful judges, gave some
consideration to enabling a Guatemalan applicant to sue a Chicago confirming bank with
whom the applicant had not dealt. What prompted Judge Shadur's consideration of the
applicant's action was the confirming bank's seemingly grossly negligent payment against
documents that fraudulently attested to the shipment of black beans to Guatemala. A
document appeared to bear a date of presentation to the bank that should have provided
a glaring indication of fraud or forgery. On rehearing it appeared that the evidence re-
flected a wrong date of presentation and consequently no negligence was attributable to
the confirming bank. See Instituto Nacional de Comercializacion Agricola v. Continental
Bank & Trust Co., 530 F. Supp. 279 (N.D. IlL 1982).
2 This issue continues to concern courts, legislators and commentators. See Task
Force on the Study of U.C.C. Article 5, An Examination of U.C.C. Article 5, 45 Bus.
LAw. 1521 (1990) [hereinafter Task Force Report].
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tions of payment. The certainty of payment of a letter of credit
is crucial for those who, as beneficiaries, supply their money,
goods or services to applicants. The question thus arises: "Why
not make the letter of credit draft or demand for payment in-
junction-proof?" Yet what about the applicant? To leave the ap-
plicant without a remedy against fraud would equally frustrate
the applicant's expectations of the letter of credit. After all, why
should a good faith applicant agree to procure the issuance of a
letter of credit and reimburse the issuing bank if the letter of
credit becomes an automatic and unstoppable vehicle for the
perpetration of fraud? As is true with other commercial legal in-
stitutions, an approach that favors one party at the expense of
the other undermines the viability of the institution. The ques-
tion then is how to achieve an acceptable balance of equities.
More specifically, under what conditions, if any, should equita-
ble remedies be available to applicants?
While considerable doubt remains among courts and com-
mentators on the type of fraud that should warrant injunctive
relief,3 the legislature ostensibly has settled the matter by enact-
ing U.C.C. section 5-114. Section 5-114 immunizes against a
fraud-based injunction "a negotiating bank or other holder of
the draft or demand which has taken the draft or demand...
under circumstances which could make it a holder in due
course." 4  Accordingly, section 5-114 precludes injunctions
3 See id.
4 U.C.C. § 5-114(2)(a) & (b). Sections 5-114(2)(a) & (b) provide that:
(2) Unless otherwise agreed when documents appear on their face to comply
with the terms of a credit but a required document does not in fact conform to
the warranties made on negotiation or transfer of a document of title (Section
7-507) or of a certificated security (Section 8-306) or is forged or fraudulent or
there is fraud in the transaction:
(a)the issuer must honor the draft or demand for payment if honor
is demanded by a negotiating bank or other holder of the draft or de-
mand which has taken the draft or demand under the credit and under
circumstances which would make it a holder in due course (Section 3-
302) and in an appropriate case would make it a person to whom a docu-
ment of title has been duly negotiated (Section 7-502) or a bona fide
purchaser of a certificated security (Section 8-302); and
(b)in all other cases as against its customer, an issuer acting in good
faith may honor the draft or demand for payment despite notification
from the customer of fraud, forgery or other defect not apparent on the
face of the documents but a court of appropriate jurisdiction may enjoin
such honor.
The references to U.C.C. sections in this article will be to versions in force in New York
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against a negotiating bank that qualifies as a holder in due
course, leaving the beneficiary who did not negotiate his draft
vulnerable to a fraud-based injunction. A similar line is drawn
by the law of other major financial centers such as in France,
Germany, Great Britain and Italy.'
Although the legislature has drawn a clear line between the
rights of a beneficiary and those of a negotiating bank holder in
due course by enacting U.C.C. section 5-114, the Second Circuit
has recently blurred this line. In All Serv. Exportacao, Importa-
cao Comercio, S.A. v. Banco Bamerindus do Brazil, S.A.
("Banco Bamerindus")6 the Second Circuit affirmed an unre-
ported decision of the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York.7 Banco Bamerindus involved a
fraudulent shipment of black beans to Brazil. This unreported
decision held that a letter of credit had to be paid by its issuer
even though a Brazilian court had enjoined such payment. The
draft had not been negotiated by the beneficiary and was in the
beneficiary's possession at the time payment was ordered by the
district court.
The Banco Bamerindus decision represents an unjustified
extension of New York law as formulated principally by the New
York Court of Appeals in First Commercial Bank v. Gotham
Originals, Inc. ("Gotham")." Gotham had denied injunctive re-
lief against a bank holder of a beneficiary's drafts because it
found that the draft in question had been accepted by the issu-
ing bank, even though the acceptance might have been procured
by fraud. First Commercial Bank ("First Commercial") (the
bank holding the beneficiary's accepted draft) was described by
the New York court as having negotiated the beneficiary's draft.
This description of First Commercial's status provided a basis
for the Second Circuit to distinguish Banco Bamerindus and
Gotham. However, both the district and the Second Circuit
Banco Bamerindus courts rejected this distinction and noted
that the New York Court of Appeals declined to base its deci-
or other states at the time of the court decisions discussed in the principal text. When
more recent versions of the same or amended U.C.C. sections are discussed, they %ill be
identified.
See infra notes 153-75 and accompanying text.
6 921 F.2d 32 (2d Cir. 1990).
No. Civ. 90-6797, 1990 WL 170343 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 31, 1990).
64 N.Y.2d 287, 475 N.E.2d 1255, 486 N.Y.S.2d 715 (1985).
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sion upon First Commercial's status as a holder in due course. In
rejecting the distinction between a beneficiary and a bank holder
of beneficiary's draft (which may or may not become a holder in
due course), the Second Circuit read Gotham in the light most
favorable to the beneficiary. Before Banco Bamerindus, a fraud-
ulent beneficiary holding his own accepted time draft was, under
U.C.C. section 5-114, subject to the issuing bank's defense of
fraud or to an applicant's injunction against payment. After
Banco Bamerindus such a beneficiary is entitled to payment in
the influential Second Circuit and beyond.'
Before Banco Bamerindus, Gotham had already been un-
duly extended by New York's appellate division and court of ap-
peals in Supreme Merchandise Co. Inc v. Chemical Bank
("Chemical")10 to prevent an attachment of letter of credit
funds where the paying bank had accepted the time drafts
"prior to the service of the second order of attachment."'1
Chemical, in turn, was interpreted by the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York in Algemene Bank
Nederland N.V. v. Soysen Tarim Urumleri Dis Ticaret"2 as pro-
tecting an assignee of beneficiary's proceeds against a judgment
creditor, even though the draft had not been accepted in writing
or certified as payable by the paying bank.13 Banco Bamerindus'
extension of Gotham and Chemical's immunity to a possibly
fraudulent beneficiary holding his own draft after its acceptance
by the payor bank completed a protective circle around holders
of letter of credit time drafts. Now included in this circle are:
negotiating banks that are holders in due course, negotiating
banks that do not qualify as holders in due course, assignees of
proceeds, good faith beneficiaries and fraudulent or possibly
fraudulent beneficiaries.
The New York state and federal courts justified their deci-
sions by arguing that the availability of U.C.C. article 5 injunc-
tions is subject to U.C.C. article 4 rules on finality and priority
' In Union Export Company v. N.I.B. Intermarket A.B et al., 786 S.W.2d 628, 630-
32 (Tenn. 1990), the Supreme Court of Tennessee adopted not only Gotham's holding
but also its policy considerations.
1- 117 A.D.2d 424, 503 N.Y.S.2d 9 (1st Dep't), aff'd, 70 N.Y.2d 344, 514 N.E.2d 1358,
520 N.Y.S.2d 734 (1986).
1' Id. at 425, 503 N.Y.S.2d at 10.
12 748 F. Supp. 177 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
13 Id. at 181.
(Vol. 58:369
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of payment. This reasoning assumes that a beneficiary who
holds an accepted time draft, regardless of how broadly "accept-
ance" is defined, receives final payment of the letter of credit or
is inevitably entitled to such payment from the moment the ac-
ceptance is issued. Such reasoning also assumes that although a
letter of credit accepted time draft is neither deposited nor sub-
mitted for collection in a manner consistent with U.C.C. article
4, it is nevertheless subject to this article.
Since New York is both a national and world center of letter
of credit issuances, confirmations, acceptances, negotiations and
payments, Gotham and Banco Bamerindus are likely to disrupt
national and international letter of credit law and practice. A
New York confirming bank forced to pay and to ignore the for-
eign court injunction will, in all likelihood, be denied reimburse-
ment by the foreign issuing bank subject to the foreign court
injunction. If the New York confirming bank reimburses itself
by debiting the account of the foreign bank, the New York
bank's account with the foreign issuing bank will be similarly
debited by the foreign correspondent bank. In this respect, Go-
tham and Banco Bamerindus add uncertainty to the considera-
ble distrust that presently plagues the issuing-confirming bank
relationships. 14 This distrust often results in the confirming
bank's costly requirement of prepayment or full collateralization
of its confirmation.
By reinforcing the need for prepayment and full collateral-
ization, Banco Bamerindus and Gotham discourage the exten-
sion of credit among correspondent banks, one of the most sig-
nificant benefits of correspondent banking relationships. In
addition, foreign beneficiaries faced with a fraud-based injunc-
tion at their place of business are likely to bypass their confirm-
ing banks and present their documents directly to the issuing
bank in New York. In time, banks within the Second Circuit's
jurisdiction will become known as issuers of fraud-proof time
letters of credit. Actual or potential fraudsters will find this fea-
ture desirable, as will some good faith beneficiaries who fear
their buyers' bad faith injunctions. Yet good faith applicants
aware of their beneficiaries' fraud and foreign banks caught be-
tween contradictory judicial orders will find the fraud-injunc-
2" See Boris Kozolchyk, Strict Compliance and The Reasonable Document
Checker, 56 BRooK L REv. 45, 47-49 (1990).
1992]
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
tion-proof time drafts unacceptable.
Equally important are the decisions' implications for the act
of state and comity doctrines. Banks' willingness to act as corre-
spondents for international letter of credit transactions presup-
poses a level international legal "playing field." The playing field
is not level, however, when beneficiaries in one jurisdiction enjoy
an upper hand over the applicants of another. Contrary to the
act of state and comity doctrines, bank "A" in country "Y" will
now be compelled to pay while bank "B" in country "Z" will be
under a similar order not to pay when faced with the same exact
set of facts. Gotham's and Banco Bamerindus's impact upon the
act of state and comity doctrines is serious enough to merit care-
ful analysis. Nevertheless, the complexity and far ranging effects
of the U.C.C article 4 and 5 issues raised by these decisions is
such that this Article will only be able to focus on these issues
and not on the act of state and comity issues.
I. BACKGROUND: PAYMENT AND FINAL PAYMENT OF CHECKS AND
OF INTERNATIONAL LETTERS OF CREDIT
A. U.C.C. Articles 4 and 5 Generally
While an article 4 transaction usually involves the payment
of a check, the payment addressed by article 4 generally is not a
direct payment by the drawee bank to the original payee.
Rather, payment is usually by the drawee to an intermediary
collecting bank.15 Commonly the check is deposited by the origi-
nal payee or subsequent endorsee with a depositary bank. The
depositary bank may attempt to collect the check itself by
presenting it directly to the drawee bank or may send the check
for collection to another bank, known as a collecting bank. The
collecting bank may, in turn, present the check directly for pay-
ment to the drawee bank or it may do so indirectly through an-
" See FREDERICK K. BEUTEL & MILTON R. SCHROEDER, BANK OFFICER'S HANDBOOK
OF CommERcL L BANKING LAW 365-75 (1982). These authors find it necessary to remind
the reader that:
at common law when an instrument was drawn or made payable on a bank in a
city which had two or more banks, the paper was required to be sent to one
other than the drawee or payor. If the instrument was sent directly to the
drawee for collection, any loss resulting from failure of the proceeds to be re-
turned fell to the bank sending the instruments, on the theory that it was im-




other collecting bank, which presents the check to the drawee
bank at a local or regional clearinghouse. 8
Unlike article 4 checks, an article 5 letter of credit draft is
usually paid directly to its payee-beneficiary by any one of sev-
eral banks. As a rule the letter of credit itself is drawn by an
issuing or confirming bank and is payable by these banks against
presentation of a draft or demand for payment drawn by the
beneficiary accompanied by the documents specified in the letter
of credit. Generally the issuing bank is located in the applicant's
place of business and the confirming bank in the beneficiary's
place of business. If the credit is merely advised and not con-
firmed, i.e., if it does not engage the advising bank's liability, the
draft or demand is presented to the advising bank that forwards
the documents for payment to the issuing bank. Advising banks,
however, can also pay the draft or demand when they are nomi-
nated to act as paying banks by the issuing or confirming banks.
Some credits do not nominate a specific bank to pay or to
negotiate the beneficiary's draft, but authorize any bank to ne-
gotiate the beneficiary's draft. The authorization is in the form
of a clause enabling acceptance or payment to a bona fide holder
of a beneficiary's draft. A credit that contains such an authoriza-
tion is known as a negotiation credit. A negotiation credit does
not allow for the negotiation of the credit because credits, unlike
drafts, are not negotiable. They are only transferable.'
A transferable credit is one that allows a transferee to pre-
sent a draft or demand for payment accompanied by specified
documents, as if the transferee were a beneficiary, subject only
to terms and conditions of the transfer.' As a rule the original
16 Beutel and Schroeder provide the following illustration of a typical collection
process:
A buyer from Champaign, Illinois, may give a check drawn on a Champaign
bank to a merchant in Winnetka. The merchant will deposit the check in his
Winnetka bank, the Winnetka bank may then send it through clearings to its
Chicago correspondent bank, the Chicago correspondent will send it to a sec-
ond Chicago bank that is a correspondent of the Champaign drawee bank, and
the second Chicago bank will then send the paper to the Champaign bank.
(When all or some of the banks are members of a common clearinghouse, the
numbers of banks needed to handle the instruments may be reduced).
BEUrF= & ScHRoEDm, supra note 15, at 368-69.
17 See Boris Kozolchyk, Letters of Credit, in INTmNATioNAL E CYCLOPEDIA OF COM-




beneficiary retains a portion of the credit and transfers the re-
maining portion. To be transferred, the credit must be labeled
"transferable." In addition, a transferable credit is subject to re-
strictions with respect to the contents of some of the documents
and to the number of total transfers. When a negotiating bank
purchases an original beneficiary's or a transferee's draft and
does so without recourse against the beneficiary or the trans-
feree, where the beneficiary and transferee are concerned, the
negotiating bank has paid the credit.
B. The Final Payment of Checks
The Banco Bamerindus and Gotham courts assumed that
the U.C.C. article 4 rules on finality of payment and unavailabil-
ity of injunctions applied equally to article 4 and article 5 ac-
ceptances and payments. Since this assumption is central to the
courts' reasoning, it deserves scrutiny. First, it is necessary to
inquire whether article 4 applies to Banco Bamerindus and Go-
tham time drafts. As indicated earlier, an article 4 check ordina-
rily undergoes provisional settlements and clearings before final
payment by the drawee bank. Each provisional settlement in the
collection chain is a form of temporary payment.
Article 4 resorted to the notion of "final payment" to firm
up or to add finality to provisional settlements, thereby facilitat-
ing the process of clearance and reciprocal debits and credits
among banks that participate in the collection and payment
chain.19 At times, the acts of final payments are apparent to the
19 In relevant part, U.C.C. section 4-213 states:
(1) An item is finally paid by a payor bank when the bank has done any of the
following, whichever happens first:
(a) paid the item in cash; or
(b) settled for the item without reserving a right to revoke the settle-
ment and without having such right under statute, clearing house rule or
agreement; or
(c) completed the process of posting the item to the indicated account
of the drawer, maker or other person charged therewith; or
(d) made a provisional settlement for the item and failed to revoke the
settlement in the time and manner permitted by statute, clearing house
rule or agreement.
Upon final payment under subparagraphs (b), (c) or (d) the payor bank shall be
accountable for the amount of the item.
(2) If the provisional settlement for an item between the presenting and payor
banks is made through a clearing house or by debits or credits in an account
between them, then to the extent that provisional debits or credits for the
[Vol. 58:369
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collecting bank or payee of the check. This is the case when a
collecting bank receives a wire transfer from a drawee bank for
the amount of the check or when the payee of the check receives
a cash payment from the same bank. Other times, however, the
act of final payment is not apparent either to the collecting
bank, the payee or the check depositor. Such is the case when a
drawee bank completes the process of posting the check or when
this bank fails to revoke a provisional settlement in the time and
manner "permitted by statute, clearing house rule or agree-
ment. '21 As creatures of a bank clearing and settlement process,
these bookkeeping transactions do not reflect what a non-bank
payee understands by final payment. To such a payee, final pay-
ment means "cash in my pocket"22 and not a mere bookkeeping
item are entered in accounts between the presenting and payor banks or be-
tween the presenting and successive prior collecting banks seriatim, they be-
come final upon final payment of the item by the payor bank.
Id. (emphasis added). As stated by U.C.C. section 4-213 comment 1:
Final payment of an item is important for a number of reasons. It is one of the
several factors determining the relative priorities between items and noticeS,
stop orders, legal process and set offs (Section 4-303). It is the "end of the line"
in the collection process and the "turn around" point commencing the return
flow of proceeds. It is the point at which many provisional settlements be-
come final.
Id. (emphasis added). As stated in an early and still insightful commentary to article 4:
Receipt and final payment by the last of the collecting banks renders irrevoca-
ble all conditional credits granted by each of the banks in the collection chain
to its immediate transferor, including the credit granted to the customer of the
depositary bank. The collection process is thereby terminated, the customer
becoming an absolute creditor of the next succeeding bank.
See Note, The Proposed Uniform Commercial Code: Bank Deposits and Collections, 50
COLUm L. REv. 802 (1950).
20 For the "media of remittance" or of payment of items, see U.C.C. section 4-211,
which, in relevant part states:
(1) A collecting bank may taken in settlement of an item
(a) a check of the remitting bank or of another bank on any bank except
the remitting bank; or
(b) a cashier's check or similar primary obligation of a remitting bank
which is a member of or clears through a member of the eame clearing
house or group as the collecting bank; or
(c) appropriate authority to charge an account of the remitting bank or
of another bank with the collecting bank; or
(d) if the item is drawn upon or payable by a person other than a bank,
a cashier's check, certified check or other bank check or obligation.
Id. (emphasis added).
21 See the text of U.C.C. § 4-213(1)(b) & (c), supra note 20.
This writer owes to E. Adamson Hoebel, the great legal anthropologist, the "cash




Recognizing that funds which pay for checks can earn inter-
est to the payor banks at the expense of other banks and their
customers, bank regulators have from time to time sought to
limit the time within which the payor must pay or dishonor.
This time limit is referred to in article 4 parlance as the "mid-
night" deadline.2 3
The article 4 firming up of provisional settlements also re-
quires protection against last minute interferences by actual or
potential creditors. These interferences occur: (1) by judicial ac-
tions to prevent payments; (2) by judicial sequestration or at-
tachment of funds; (3) by customers' actions to stop payment; or
(4) by payor banks to setoff their claims against payees. Banking
lawyers refer to these interferences as the "four legals."' After
listing these interferences, U.C.C. section 4-303 also lists the acts
that bar the interference because it "came too late. '25 While sec-
asked what kind of final payment he wanted from a United States government entity
and responded in the quoted fashion.
22 U.C.C. section 4-104(h) provides: "'Midnight deadline' with respect to a bank is
midnight on its next banking day following the banking day on which it receives the
relevant item or notice or from which the time for taking action commences to run,
whichever is later . . . ." Id.
For an interesting description on how the drafters arrived at the notion of a mid-
night deadline, see J. Fairfax Leary, Reflections of a Drafter: J. Fairfax Leary, 43 OIo
ST. L. J. 557 (1982). Leary stated that first the drafters tried "a day blockage" i.e., in
posting checks the bank had to post checks in order of arrival. Checks that came on
Monday had to be posted before the checks that came on Tuesday. Following the Second
World War, the deferred posting rule was adopted. Under this rule, instead of having to
pay or dishonor the check before close of the business day on the day in which it was
presented, banks were given until midnight of the day after, if a provisional settlement
was made on the day of receipt. In Leary's words: "Bank lawyers did not like the day
blockage, so we invented something called the midnight deadline. And up until and
through the spring 1950 draft that was the basic cutoff point for priorities and for when
the check was finally paid." Id. at 561 (emphasis added).
' The expression "four legals" refers to the "knowledge or notice of the customer's
death, incompetency or bankruptcy, the customer's stop-order, legal process, such as an
injunction, attachment or garnishment, and setoff by the payor-bank. These are listed in
U.C.C. § 4-303(1). See JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE 803 (3d ed., 1988).
25 U.C.C. section 4-303 provides:
(1) Any knowledge, notice, or stop order received by, legal process served upon
or set off exercised by a payor bank, whether or not effective under other rules
of law to terminate, suspend or modify the bank's right or duty to pay an item
or to charge its customer's account for the item, comes too late to so terminate,
suspend or modify such right or duty if the knowledge, notice, stop order or
legal process is received or served and a reasonable time for the bank to act
[Vol. 58:369
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tion 4-303 was clearly intended for the protection of provisional
settlements and clearings, it did not immunize payments to
fraudulent payees of "accepted" drafts or checks. Neither did
this section protect the payee of the draft or check against the
drawee's defenses or against the customer's or applicant's in-
junction. To begin with, when a drawee bank pays the check di-
rectly to the payee and such a payee is not a holder in due
course, the drawee bank can raise against the payee "all defenses
of any party which would be available in an action on a simple
contract. ' 26 Moreover, as between the drawee bank and the
payee with whom the drawee bank has dealt, neither the pay-
ment nor the acceptance of the payee's draft is final in the sense
that it cannot be recovered by the payor. In accordance with
U.C.C. section 3-418, the finality of payment or acceptance can
only be claimed by "a holder in due course, or by a person who
has in good faith changed his position in reliance on the pay-
ment. '27 As the Official Comment to section 3-418 explains:
The section follows decisions under the original Act, in making pay-
ment or acceptance final only in favor of a holder in due course, or a
transferee who has the rights of a holder in due course under the shel-
ter principle. If no value has been given for the instrument, the holder
loses nothing by the recovery of the payment or the avoidance of the
acceptance, and is not entitled to profit at the expense of the drawee
28
This analysis applies equally to instruments, such as cash-
iers' checks, which have been treated as cash or as acceptances
issued in advance of the presentation of the checks for their pay-
thereon expires or the setoff is exercised after the bank has done any of the
following-
(a) accepted or certified the item;
(b) paid the item in cash;
(c) settled for the item without reserving a right to revoke the settle-
ment and without having such right under statute, clearing house rule or
agreement;
(d) completed the process of posting the item to the indicated account
of the drawer, maker or other person to be charged therewith or other-
wise has evidenced by examination of such indicated account and by
action its decision to pay the item ....
Id.
28 U.C.C. §§ 3-306(b) & 3-305(2).
' U.C.C. § 3-418.
See U.C.C. § 3-418 cmt. 3.
1992]
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ment.2 e Usually cashiers' checks are treated as accepted in ad-
vance and they "cannot be dishonored by the bank because of
an indebtedness to it by one of its customers."30 An exception is
recognized, however, where the payee of the cashier's check
deals directly with the payor bank and engages in fraud to ob-
tain the issuance of the check when "the payor bank is entitled
to stop payment on the check."'"
C. The Final Payment of Letters of Credit
Unlike checks, letter of credit drafts, even after they have
been accepted, do not become part of settlements and clearing
mechanisms. As a rule the collecting bank in the letter of credit
collection process sends the draft and documents directly to the
issuing or confirming bank or presents them to a nominated pay-
ing bank.32 None of the banks that act as intermediaries in the
2 See Anderson, Clayton & Co v. Farmers National Bank, 624 F.2d 105 (10th Cir.
1980).
10 Id. at 110, citing Swiss Credit Bank v. Virginia National Bank, Fairfax, 538 F.2d
587, 588 (4th Cir. 1976).
31 Id. (citing TPO, Inc. v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp., 487 F.2d 131 (3d Cir.
1973)). See also In re Johnson, 552 F.2d 1072 (4th Cir. 1977); Wilmington Trust Co. v.
Delaware Auto Sales, 271 A.2d 41 (Del. 1970). But c.f. Da Silva v. Sanders, 600 F. Supp.
1008, 1010-14 (D.D.C. 1984) (discussing "the two statutory approaches").
2 It should be noted that under certain circumstances a bank presenting a letter of
credit documentary draft for payment may act as an article 4 collecting bank uninvolved
in clearings and provisional settlements. For example, a confirming bank may have de-
termined that the draft and documents presented by the beneficiary do not comply with
the terms of the credit but may have agreed with the beneficiary to present the docu-
mentary draft on a "collection only" basis i.e., as a mere agent for collection from the
issuing bank or applicant for the credit. This type of collection, however, is also subject
to different rules from those that prevail in an article 5 presentation. The presentment of
an article 4 documentary draft can be subject to instructions that require presentment
"on arrival of the goods" or "when the goods" arrive. Such instructions are incompatible
with an article 5 payment which, in accordance with section 5-114(1), must be made
"regardless of whether the goods or documents conform to the underlying contract for
sale or other contract between the customer and the beneficiary." U.C.C. § 5-114. In ad-
dition, the release of documents is made subject to rules that are similarly inconsistent
with letter of credit law and practice. Section 4-503(a), for example, imposes the duty on
the presenting bank to deliver "the documents to the drawee on acceptance of the draft
if it is payable more than three days after presentment." U.C.C. § 4-503(a). Many instru-
ments sent for international collection are made subject to the International Chamber of
Commerce Rules. INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE UNIFORM RULES FOR THE COL-
LECTION OF COMMERCIAL PAPER, Publication 322 (1978). Even though a collection would
be subject to these rules, article 4 may be applied where these rules are not inconsistent




process of collecting the letter of credit draft or demand for pay-
ment credit or debit their predecessors' or successors' accounts
until the issuing or confirming banks decide to pay. As stated
earlier, such payment can be made by the issuing or confirming
banks themselves or by their correspondents authorized to debit
or credit the appropriate accounts. Hence, the specification of a
time within which the issuing or confirming bank must honor a
beneficiary's draft or demand for payment in letter of credit law
and practice is neither the transactional nor the legal equivalent
of article 4's "midnight deadline."
'3
Both the Uniform Customs and Practices for Documentary
Credits ("UCP")34 requirement that the issuing bank examine
the beneficiary's documents within a "reasonable time" and the
U.C.C.'s deferral "until the close of the third banking day fol-
lowing receipt of the documents '3sa reflect a desire to give banks
enough time to examine carefully the draft and documents. The
examination period also allows a beneficiary the opportunity to
cure discrepancies and either resell or reship the goods if the
documents are rejected by a bank.3 8 The direct contact in the
article 5 letter of credit transaction between the beneficiary and
the issuing, confirming, paying or negotiating banks explains the
difference between a three-day period for examination and pay-
ment and a midnight deadline. It will be recalled that article 4%
examination and payment period reflect a direct contact primar-
ly between the payor and intermediary banks. The article 4 pe-
riod also reflects a concern with a quick firming up of provisional
settlements and an elimination of the period of uncompensated
use of other parties' check funds. Since neither U.C.C. article 5
'3 See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
m See Int'l Chamber of Commerce, Publication No. 400, Uniform Customs and
Practices for Documentary Credits (1983) [hereinafter UCP].
35 See UCP, art. 16; U.C.C. § 5-112(1)(a).
" In relevant part, the Official Comment to section 5-112 states:
Many letters of credit involve transactions in international trade and include
as required documents the documents of title controlling the possinsion of
goods on their way to the place of issuance of the credit. The ordinary rule
requiring physical return of dishonored documentary drafts (Section 4-302)
would therefore frequently work commercial hardship on the mercantile par-
ties to the transaction; resale of the goods might be more difficult if the con-
trolling documents of title were not available at the place of arrival of the
goods.
U.C.C. § 5-112 cmt. 2.
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nor the UCP is concerned with firming up provisional settle-
ments and clearings, neither set of rules contain analogues to ar-
ticle 4 "final payment" or "four legals" provisions.3 7 Instead, the
UCP and the U.C.C. specify the meaning of the bank's commit-
ment to pay and the instances in which payment is without re-
course to the beneficiary.
The issuing or confirming bank's commitment to pay varies
with the kind of draft required by the letter of credit. If the
letter of credit requires payment upon presentation of a draft
drawn on the issuing or confirming bank, the draft is termed a
"sight" draft and will be paid as soon as the bank determines
that the draft and accompanying documents comply with the
terms and conditions of the credit. The meaning of the sight
payment in letter of credit customary law, then, is actually to
pay the credit or to assure that payment will be made by the
designated party.3 8 This meaning coincides with the layman's
understanding of final payment as "cash in his pocket. ' 3 The
UCP also makes clear that when the payment is made by a ne-
gotiating bank, the bank pays "without recourse to drawers and/
or bona fide holders of drafts drawn by the beneficiary .... "10
If the letter of credit requires payment at a certain time af-
ter the presentation of the draft and documents, it is known as
an "acceptance" credit and the draft is known as a "time,"
"tenor" or "usance" draft. If the draft and documents comply
with the terms and conditions of the credit, the bank will accept
the beneficiary's draft, thereby promising to pay at a future
time. The act of acceptance is affected by the bank's writing or
stamping the word "accepted" across the draft's face or on the
acceptor's column, and then signing and dating it. It should be
noted, however, that the accepting bank's obligation to honor an
acceptance is not discharged by merely accepting the draft. As
stated in the final draft of the proposed revision of the UCP, to
37 See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
See Draft, Int'l Chamber of Commerce, Publication 500, Uniform Customs and
Practices for Documentary Credits, I.C.C. Doc. No. 470-37/104, art. 10(a) (Sept. 18, 1992)
[hereinafter UCP 500]. With respect to acceptances, article 10(a) (iii) allows drafts
against the applicants and tacitly payments by the same party. The present UCP revi-
sion specifies acceptance by the issuing or drawee bank and payment of the acceptance
by the issuing bank, directly or indirectly, in the event that the drawee bank does not
accept the drafts drawn on it. See id., art. 9(a) & (b).
39 See supra note 22.
'0 See UCP 500, supra note 38, at art. 10(a)(iv).
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honor an acceptance credit the honoring bank must not only ac-
cept the draft but, must also pay it at maturity.
41
Once the issuing or confirming bank accepts a letter of
credit draft, its liability on that credit is no longer contingent. It
becomes an unconditional liability: the accepting bank has de-
termined that the documents comply with the terms and condi-
tions of the credit and that payment is due on the date specified
in the accepted draft. The bank's unconditional acceptance does
not mean that the issuing or confirming bank cannot raise de-
fenses against the beneficiary holder of the draft. By accepting
the item, the issuing or confirming bank is not limited to post-
payment actions such as unjust enrichment or mistaken pay-
ment, against the beneficiary. The same rules on availability of
defenses discussed previously in connection with checks apply to
accepted drafts in the hands of the payee-beneficiary. As a party
who has dealt with a beneficiary who is not a holder in due
course, the drawee bank can raise defenses such as setoff, accord
and satisfaction and beneficiary's consent to post-acceptance
amendments, which require additional or modified documents.
In addition, U.C.C. section 5-114 expressly leaves it to the
bank's discretion to raise the defense of fraud by allowing banks
to refuse to honor the allegedly fraudulent draft or demand for
payment.
42
If the mere writing or stamping of an acceptance on a time
draft were to entail not only unconditionality, but also finality of
payment, letter of credit practice would be significantly changed.
As of the moment the issuing bank signified its acceptance, the
confirming bank would be able to wipe out its confirmation lia-
bility from its books. Conversely, if the confirming bank were
the one signifying the acceptance, the issuing bank would have
to provide prepayment immediately preceding or reimbursement
immediately following the writing or stamping of the acceptance.
Since such changes would inevitably lead to unjust enrichment
by requiring payment or reimbursement for moneys not paid
and not likely to be paid, in the immediate future, banks could
not adopt them.
41 See UCP 500, supra note 38, at art. 9(a)(iii). It provides that "if the credit pro-
vides for acceptance; a. by the issuing bank - to accept Draft(s) dravm by the Beneficiary
on the issuing Bank and pay them at maturity ...." Id. (emphasis in original).
42 U.C.C. § 5-114(2)(b).
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A changed practice could only have been justified if the is-
suing and confirming banks were part of an article 4 collection
chain and either of them had provisionally settled with the col-
lecting banks before the signification of their acceptance. In
other words, the equation between the signification of the ac-
ceptance and final payment would be justified if the acceptance
were to be used by the accepting-payor bank as the means with
which to pay other banks in the collection chain for their previ-
ous giving of value to the accepting-payor bank. No such justifi-
cation exists when the acceptance is not used as the means with
which to effect final payment either to other banks or to the
beneficiary. For this reason a letter of credit acceptance in the
hands of the drawer of the accepted draft or his agent for collec-
tion cannot be deemed as having been finally paid and cannot be
treated as cash until it is cash and is in the beneficiary's
pocket.43
Letter of credit acceptances, however, are often bought or
"discounted" by the accepting bank itself or bought in the open
market by other banks, investors or speculators. Where the ac-
ceptance is bought by a bank or other holder under circum-
stances that would qualify such a buyer as a holder in due
course, payment will be much more certain than if it were to the
beneficiary or his agent. As a holder in due course, the negotiat-
ing bank is not subject to the issuing or confirming bank's per-
sonal defenses against the beneficiary and is also immune to the
defense of fraud and to the fraud injunction alluded to in U.C.C.
section 5-114.
4
Sight and acceptance credits are by far the most common
types of letters of credit payable against the presentation of
drafts. Nevertheless, in the last fifty years of international bank-
ing practice, variations have emerged as a result of demands by
customers and beneficiaries for more advantageous credit terms
and stamp tax avoidance. One of these variations, the "deferred
payment" credit, was first used in Japanese Far Eastern trade in
the early 1950s and is now widely used in Europe." On its face,
" See supra note 22.
" For the text of U.C.C. § 5-144(2)(a) & (b), see supra note 4. For a discussion of
the separation of the letter of credit draft and acceptance from the underlying transac-
tions (referred to in European and Latin American legal literature as "abstraction"), see
Kozolchyk, supra note 17, at 113-14.
" It is believed that these credits were developed to accommodate certain foreign
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a deferred payment credit looks lke an irrevocable sight credit,
except for a stipulation that payment will be made at a specified
period after the beneficiary's presentation of the documents.
The documents, meanwhile, are released by the issuing bank to
its customer.
The bank that issues or confirms a deferred payment credit
occasionally issues a statement to the beneficiary acknowledging
that the documents received from the beneficiary complied with
the terms and conditions of the credit. This statement is usually
issued as a letter or memorandum and not as a negotiable in-
strument such as a draft or promissory note.40 Frequently, how-
ever, the only acknowledgment issued by the issuing or confirm-
ing bank is simply a receipt for the tendered documents. The
removal of the conditionality of a deferred payment credit by
the issuance of an express statement of compliance or of a re-
ceipt of documents is not unlike the issuance of an acceptance in
Banco Bamerindus and Gotham. Thus, the logic of these deci-
sions may well transform deferred payment credits into "final
payment" credits. Yet, as with the payment of sight drafts and
of time drafts in the hands of the beneficiary or his collection
agent, payment of a deferred payment credit is "not over until it
is over." In fact, many European issuing banks warn the benefi-
ciaries of their deferred payment credits that even if their advis-
ing banks issue commitments to pay at maturity, such commit-
ments will not be recognized as binding by the issuing bank.
With this basic overview, it will be easier to follow the anal-
exchange restrictions in effect in Japan in the early 1950's. For an early account of the
use of these credits in European trade, see Bontoux, Un Point D'histoire Bancoire. Le
"Credit Documentaire Differe", 1956 Rxv. BANQUE 583-91. There is a growing amount of
European literature on the subject of deferred payments. See, e.g., Blondeel, Le Credit
Documentaire a Paiement Differe, 1964 REv. BANQuE 291; JoHANNiaS C.P. Z.u. ZAHLUNG
UND ZAHLUNGSSICHERUNG ni AusHANDEL 61, 152 (6th ed. 1986). On Latin American and
especially South American practices, see Stoker, PROBLEMATCA EN ToRNo A LA UTLIZA-
CION DEL CREDrro DocuzmsENin o EN LATNoAmcA FzoaxCION LTINOAMDEI CANA DE
BANcos, EL CREDrro DOCUMENTAMO EN AMEmCA LATtnA 11-12 (Bogota 1970) (arguing
that deferred payment credits are frequently unacceptable to issuing banks, forcing the
buyer to seek the intervention of banks from neighboring countries as issuers). For a
helpful analysis of the problems posed by deferred payment credits and useful sugges-
tions, see Gerald T. McLaughlin, Should Deferred Payment Letters of Credit be Specifi-
cally Treated in a Revision of Article 5, 56 BRoov. L. Rnv. 149 (1990).
"I If the communication were to be issued as a negotiable instrument, such as a
draft, it would unavoidably become an acceptance credit. In addition, as a negotiable
instrument it would be subject to a stamp tax.
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yses of the Banco Bamerindus decisions and to see where they
went wrong.
II. THE BANCO BAMERINDUS DECISIONS
A. Facts
All Service Exportacao, Importacao Comercio, S.A. ("All
Service") is a Brazilian company that entered into a contract to
buy 15,000 metric tons of black beans for a price of approxi-
mately $8 million dollars from M.M. International Ltd.
("MMI"), a Grand Cayman corporation owned by the People's
Republic of China. The beans were to be shipped from China to
Brazil. Payment was by means of an irrevocable negotiable letter
of credit for the amount of the purchase in favor of MMI. The
letter of credit was issued by Banco do Brazil ("Banco") in Bra-
zil and was payable by means of a time draft at that bank's New
York branch. It was advised but not confirmed by First Chicago
International Bank ("First Chicago").
In June 1990 the beans were shipped from China. They ar-
rived in Brazil in early October. According to the district court,
"[i]t is not disputed that in late August, First Chicago presented
to Banco's New York office MMI's draft, which Banco's New
York branch marked 'Accepted.' Payment on the draft was to be
made on October 29, 1990.' ' 47 All Service successfully filed mo-
tions in Brazil and New York State courts to obtain temporary
restraining orders ("TROs") against Banco and First Chicago,
alleging defendants' fraud in the underlying transaction and in
the presentation of documents. The TROs enjoined the defend-
ants from paying the letter of credit. It is unclear which party
held the draft when the TROs were filed in both New York and
Brazil. It is also unclear whether Banco delivered the accepted
draft or sent notification of the acceptance to the beneficiary
before the issuance of the TROs. The defendants removed the
case to the United States District Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of New York.
47 All Service Exportacao, Importacao Comercio S.A. v. Banco Bamerindus do Bra-
zil, S.A., No. 90 Civ. 6797, 1990 WL 170343, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 31, 1990).
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B. The District Court Opinion
The district court held a hearing on All Service's motion for
a preliminary injunction, allowing beneficiary MMI to intervene
as of right.48 All Service's request for a TRO and preliminary
injunction relied on U.C.C. section 5-114(2)(a), which allows an
injunction against a drawing tainted with fraud in the underly-
ing transaction unless "honor is demanded by a negotiating
bank or other holder of the draft or demand which has taken the
draft or demand under the credit and under circumstances that
would make it a holder in due course ....
MMI, opposing the injunction, contended that U.C.C. sec-
tion 4-303 prevailed over section 5-114. As noted earlier, section
4-303 provides that legal process served upon a payor bank seek-
ing to terminate the bank's duty to pay an item "comes too late"
if the legal process is received or served after the bank has "ac-
cepted or certified the item." 0 In so contending, MMI relied on
the decision by the New York Court of Appeals in First Com-
mercial Bank v. Gotham Originals, Inc.5 1 In Gotham the New
York court concluded that U.C.C. section 4-303 supersedes sec-
tion 5-114. Accordingly, once the beneficiary's draft was ac-
cepted, the issuing-acceptor bank became unconditionally obli-
gated to the holder to pay at maturity. A TRO that arrived after
the date of the acceptance simply came "too late" to prevent
payment to the beneficiary2
All Service maintained that Gotham3 and Chemical' were
distinguishable because the banks demanding payment in those
cases had negotiated the drafts and were holders in due course,
while First Chicago was not such a holder. The district court
labeled this argument "a distinction without legal significance""
since the petitioning bank in Gotham did not claim to be a
holder in due course and the New York Court of Appeals "....
explicitly declined to base its opinion upon the petitioning
48 Id. at *3.
19 N.Y.U.C.C. § 5-114 (McKinney 1991).
0 See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
01 64 N.Y.2d 287, 475 N.E.2d 1255, 486 N.Y.S.2d 715 (1985).
02 All Service Exportacao, Importacao Comercio S.A., 1990 WL 170343 (S.D.N.Y.
Oct. 31, 1990).
- 64 N.Y.2d 287, 475 N.E.2d 1255, 486 N.Y.S.2d 715 (1985).
- 70 N.Y.2d 344, 514 N.E.2d 1358, 520 N.Y.S.2d 734 (1987).
5 All Service Exportacao, Importacao Comercio S.A., 1990 WL 170343, at *2.
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bank's status as a holder in due course." 56
Nor was United Bank Ltd. v. Cambridge Sporting Goods
Corp. applicable, according to the district court, because the
draft in that case, unlike that in Banco Bamerindus, had not
been accepted by the issuing bank before the injunction. The
district court expressed sympathy with Banco's predicament: on
the one hand, it remained subject to a Brazilian court's injunc-
tion ordering it not to pay the holder and, on the other hand, it
was about to be made subject to a federal court decision order-
ing it to pay the same holder. Yet "having entered the New York
letter of credit market of its own free will, Banco is bound by
the prevailing law of that forum.""8 To avoid the impression of
lack of hospitality to foreign, especially Brazilian, court decrees,
the district court stated that its decision "does no violence to
appropriate principles of comity between sovereign nations." 9
However, the court failed to offer any support for this assertion.
C. The Second Circuit Decision
All Service appealed the district court's denial of its motion
for a preliminary injunction. The Second Circuit affirmed the
lower court's decision.60 The Second Circuit provided more facts
than the district court, but its version of which party held the
draft during the applicable time period for section 4-303 was
also incomplete. In its initial summary, the Second Circuit indi-
cated that "the draft remained in the hands of MMI, an alleged
defrauding seller . -." Yet only three paragraphs later the
Second Circuit added: "In August, at the request of First Chi-
cago, Banco accepted the draft and retained physical possession
of it."
'6 2
The determination of which party is the holder of the ac-
cepted draft is important because it helps establish the rights
conveyed by the acceptance. If the holder of the acceptance
Id. (citing First Commercial Bank v. Gotham Originals, 64 N.Y.2d at 295, 495
N.E.2d at 1258, 486 N.Y.S.2d at 719).
57 41 N.Y.2d 254, 360 N.E.2d 943, 392 N.Y.S.2d 265 (1976).
All Service Exportacao, Importacao Comercio S.A., 1990 WL 170343, at *3.
'9 Id.
All Service Exportacao, Importacao Comercio, S.A. v. Banco Bamerindus do Bra-
zil S.A., 921 F.2d 32 (2d Cir. 1990).
01 Id. at 33 (emphasis added).
02 Id. at 34 (emphasis added).
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qualifies as a holder in due course, he will enjoy superior rights
to those of a mere holder or original payee. 3 In addition, an ac-
ceptance only becomes operative when it is delivered or notified
to its lawful holder.
Section 3-410 of the U.C.C. defines an acceptance and its
operativeness as follows: "Acceptance is the drawee's signed en-
gagement to honor the draft as presented. It must be written on
the draft, and may consist of his signature alone. It becomes op-
erative when completed by delivery or notification."" In light of
this provision, the Second Circuit's reference to the accepted
draft remaining with the beneficiary is highly significant. If what
the Second Circuit meant by "remained" is that the draft never
left the beneficiary's possession, then no valid acceptance could
have been created: how could the issuing bank write or stamp
and sign its acceptance on a draft that was never in its posses-
sion? On the other hand, if the letter of credit called for the
presentation of a draft and documents, how could the benefi-
ciary have complied without presenting the draft? The apparent
contradiction was explained by the Second Circuit in a subse-
quent statement:
Prior to the cargo's arrival in Brazil, IMI forwarded the necessary
papers to First Chicago, the advising bank to MMI, together with a
draft dated July 29, 1990, in the amount of $8,250,000. The docu-
ments appeared on their face to comply with the conditions set forth
in the letter of credit. In August, at the request of First Chicago,
Banco accepted the draft and retained physical possession of it ....
After shipment arrived in port, an independent agency determined
the beans were soybeans, rather than black beans, and presented "a
general mouldy or fermented aspect, improper for human consump-
tion." On the basis of that report, All Service decided that a fraud in
the transactions had occurred. Accordingly, it sought to prevent pay-
ment pursuant to the letter of credit by seeking an injunction in a
Brazilian court. On October 19, that court issued the requested in-
junction. One day later, MMI's agent recovered physical possession
of the draft.
65
'3See U.C.C. § 3-305; see also Bors KOZOLCHYK. CoMmuRcAL LTrTs op CREDIT IN
THE AimcAs 454-83 (1966) [hereinafter Commercial Letters of Credit] (discussing "ab-
straction" or independence of the letter of credit promise).
See U.C.C. § 3-410 (emphasis added). The 1990 Official Text of U.C.C. section 3-
409 corresponds to the 1964 version of section 3-410. The 1990 Official Text of U.C.C. is
slightly different but still requires that the acceptance "be written on the draft." See
SEECTD Coh iFxcI L STATUTES 385 (West 1991).
"' Banco Bamerindus, 921 F.2d 32, 34 (2d Cir. 1990) (emphasis added).
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Thus what the Second Circuit must have meant by the draft
"remaining" in the beneficiary's possession was that the draft
did not leave the beneficiary's possession, i.e., it was not negoti-
ated to a third party or sent for payment to Banco after MMI's
agent recovered physical possession from Banco on October 20,
1992. This fact, however, would have made it impossible for the
accepted draft to be in Banco's hands and in the process of be-
ing paid when the draft became payable on October 29 for, in
the Second Circuit's words, "the draft remained in the hands of
MMI, an alleged defrauding seller.
'66
III. ANALYSIS
A. Legal and Factual Prerequisites for the Application of
U.C.C. Articles 4 and 5
The identity and status of the holder of the accepted draft
helps determine the availability of a U.C.C. section 5-114 injunc-
tion. If the holder qualifies as a holder in due course, the injunc-
tion provided by section 5-114 is unavailable.6 7 Yet section 5-114
is not the only rule the applicability of which is determined by
the status of the holder of the draft. Even if one were to accept
the proposition that article 4 applies to letter of credit pay-
ments, section 4-303 requires that there be an acceptance or cer-
tification of what article 4 refers to as an "item."8 8 Acceptance is
not defined in article 4 of the U.C.C. However, the Official Com-
ment to section 4-303 indicates that its meaning is the same as
in section 3-410.69 As will be discussed shortly, section 4-303
does not specify when the acceptance or certification must be
issued or executed in order to qualify for priority over the "four
legals. ''7
0
1. The Meaning of Item
The term "item" is defined by section 4-104 of the U.C.C. as
"any instrument for the payment of money even though it is not
60 Id. at 33.
e See U.C.C. § 5-114(2)(a); see supra note 4.
6 U.C.C. § 4-303; see supra note 24.
See U.C.C. § 4-303 cmt. 2.
70 See supra note 24.
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negotiable but does not include money."7' The 1990 Official Ver-
sion of the U.C.C. provides further detail on the meaning of
item: "Item means an instrument or promise or order to pay
money handled by a bank for collection or payment."2
This latter definition highlights the organic connection be-
tween "item" and banking deposits and collections.73 Indeed
such a connection is inevitable given article 4's mission to pro-
vide what Karl Llewellyn described as "the legal machinery for a
clean-running collection procedure."7 4 Consistent with article 4's
mission, section 4-303 is located in part 3 of article 4 under the
heading "Collection of Items: Payor Banks." This part, then,
contains the rules that govern acts or events that take place or
could take place once the item deposited for collection reaches
the payor bank. It should be noted that in the collection-pay-
ment progression of article 4, what was originally a section 3-104
instrument, such as a draft or check, becomes an article 4 item
once it is deposited for collection with a depositary bank and is
forwarded by this bank directly or indirectly to the drawee-
payor bank. Although items can be as varied and intangible as
wire transfers or other electronically recorded, stored or trans-
mitted messages for the payment of money,75 the most common
-I U.C.C. § 4-104(g).
72 Id. (emphasis added).
73 See U.C.C. Official Comment 8 to section 4-104. It states:
Since bonds and other investment securities under Article 8 may be within the
term "instrument" or "promise," they are items and when handled by the
banks for collection are subject to this Article .... The functional limitation
on the meaning of this term [item] is the willingness of the banking system to
handle the instrument, undertaking or instruction for collection or payment.
U.C.C. § 4-104 cmt. 8.
7 Karl Llewellyn, Brief Introductory Statement Re Article 4, State of New York,
Law Revision Comm. Report, Hearings on the Uniform Commercial Code, VoL 1, 284
(1954) (emphasis added).
75 See Singer Prods. Co. v. First American Bank of New York (In re Singer Prods.
Co.), 102 B.R. 912 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1989). Singer involved a contest between banks
claiming assets of a customer-Chapter 11 debtor in possession. The connection between
the term item and the bank collection process is reiterated by the bankruptcy court in its
reasoning.
It is unclear whether a "wire transfer is an "item" taken for collection under
article 4 .... The district court for the Southern District of New York...
equated an advance on a wire transfer as part of its collection process vith that
of an advance on a check taken for collection under Article 4 principles, finding
a wire transfer to be the equivalent of an item for Article 4 purposes.
Id. at 929. For state statutory law definitions of the term item to include electronically
recorded, stored or transmitted messages for the payment of money and part of the arti-
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instrument to become an item is the check, invariably a "cash"
in contrast with a "time" or credit-instrument.
7 6
The importance of carefully applying the label "item" to the
appropriate instrument stems from the peculiarity of the rules
that govern the collection and payment of checks. As a result of
these peculiarities, the same instrument can be subject to differ-
ent rules as an article 4 "item" and as an article 5 "document."
Since letters of credit are essentially documentary promises, 7
when the letter of credit does not require a document other than
a draft or demand for payment (as is the case with "clean" cred-
its), 78 or where the draft is to be drawn against the applicant, 0
the beneficiary's draft does double duty as an order of payment
and as a letter of credit document.
The process of collection of MMI's draft described by the
Second Circuit in Banco Bamerindus is an article 5, and not an
article 4, item collection process. The beneficiary presented the
documents to a branch of the issuing bank through an interme-
diary remitting bank. This bank determined whether to honor
the draft or demand for payment after verifying the compliance
of the documents with the terms and conditions of the letter of
credit. No provisional settlements or clearings were waiting to be
firmed up while the issuing or confirming bank verified docu-
mentary compliance. Since MMI's draft was not part of an arti-
cle 4 process of collection and payment when the TRO was en-
tered and since it remained in the beneficiary's hands after the
TRO was granted, the question arises whether U.C.C. section 4-
303 is even applicable to the instant case.
2. The Context of Section 4-303
The reference to the "four legals" coming "too late" in sec-
tion 4-303(1) has an urgent, almost eleventh hour ring to it.8°
cle 4 bank deposit and collection process, see HENRY J. BAILEY & RICHARD B. HAGEDORN,
BRADY ON BANK CHECKS: THE LAW OF BANK CHECKs S11-3 (1987 & Cure. Supp. 1992).
78 BAILEY & HAGEDORN, supra note 75, at S11-1-11-2.
77 See U.C.C. § 5-103(1)(b). It defines "document" as "any paper" and does not ex-
clude drafts from such a categorization. Id.
78 See Task Force Report, supra note 1, at 1557-58.
"' See UCP art. (10)(b)(iv).
80 In the words of the late Fairfax Leary: "The final solution, now the law in Penn.
sylvania, is that priority will be determined in effect by a rule that the first to reach the
bookkeeper will be given priority. This 'race-to-the-bookkeeper' rule results from the
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Clearly, if payment of an item was not imminent, there would be
no reason to refer to the incoming knowledge, notice or stop-
order as coming too late. It would be a strange latecomer, in-
deed, if the event it was about to miss-final payment-were to
take place several days or, as is common with many bankers' ac-
ceptances, months later.81 Moreover, if the debt related to the
"four legals" were not due and payable, how could a setoff be
exercised?"2
3. Legislative History of Section 4-303
U.C.C. section 4-303 seems to have been drafted for items
for which payment was imminent and not merely prospective.
The Official Comments to its 1982 and 1990 versions confirm
this interpretation: While a payor bank is processing an item
presented for payment, "it may receive knowledge or a legal no-
tice affecting the item .... Sub-section (a) states the rule for
determining the relative priorities between these various legal
events and the item." 83
The late and lamented Professor Fairfax Leary, an article 4
provisions of § 4-303." Fairfax Leary, Jr., Article 4: Bank Deposits and Collections
Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 15 U. Prrr. L. Rnv. 565, 574 (1954); see supra
notes 24-25.
81 The 1982 and 1990 Official Comments to section 4-303 confirm the imminent fi-
nality of the act by the payor bank by placing its acceptance and certification at the
same level as its payment of the item in cash.
Once a payor bask has accepted or certified an item or has paid the item in
cash, the event has occurred that determines priorities between the item and
the various legal events usually described as the "four legals".
U.C.C. § 4-303(b) cmt. 1.
82 See Board of Trade of San Francisco v. Swiss Credit Bank, 728 F.2d 1241 (9th
Cir. 1982). The Ninth Circuit held that the bank had the right to set off amounts due
under an arbitration award against any sums it owed to beneficiary under the letter of
credit. For a discussion on bank setoffs against creditors of their customers, see D.E.
Murray, Banks Versus Creditors of Their Customers: Set-Offs Against Customers' Ac-
counts, 82 CoNIM L.J. 449 (1977); Boris Kozolchyk, supra note at 17, at 53-54: (discussing
setoffs and letter of credit law). For an analysis of this issue Canadian and English law,
see LAZAR SARNA, Lm-rTas or Cnnnrr 166, 167 (2d ed. 1986). See supra notes 24 & 81.
11 U.C.C. § 4-303 cmt. 1. Official Comment 1 to U.C.C. section 4-303 in relevant part
provides:
The comments to Section 4-213 describe the process through which an item
passes in the payor bank. Prior to this process or at any time while it is going
on, the payor bank may receive knowledge or a legal notice affecting the item.
.. Each of these events affects the account of drawer and may eliminate or
freeze all or part of whatever balance is available to pay the item.
U.C.C. § 4-303 cmt. 1 (1982).
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draftsman, described a typical section 4-303 priority battle as
one between an attachment execution served on a bank officer at
12:00 p.m. and a certification of a check by another bank officer
at the same bank at 11:50 a.m.8 4 The battle was.between, on the
one hand, the imminent payment of items by cash or by cash-
like drafts, acceptances, certifications of checks, settlements and
posting of credits or debits and, on the other hand, the "four
legals". These two sets of acts or events had to be chronologi-
cally close enough to compete in what Leary referred to as the
"race to the bookkeeper."85
Leary's description of the most common methods of pay-
ment associated with the collection of items in the late 1940s
provides clues about the function of the acceptance and certifi-
cation referred to in section 4-303. 81 One method was the imme-
diate payment of cash for cash items (mostly checks) presented
, Leary, supra note 80, at 575-76.
85 Id. at 574. See also Robert A. Riegert, Stopping Payment and Refusing Payment
on Bank Checks, 93 COMM. L. J. 137, 155-56 (1988). Professor Riegert points to examples
of competing claims at the time of final payment, such as an attempted setoff if the bank
has already paid out the money in cash. Professor Riegert goes on to illustrate the inap-
plicability of U.C.C. section 4-303 to presentations of certified or cashiers' checks at a
later time:
When, however, a bank receives notice that [the] check it has just certified was
stolen, the notice is obviously too late to prevent the certification-but it is not
too late to prevent payment to the thief at a later time; and Section 4-303 was
not intended to require such payment. Any other interpretation would lead
to absurd results. For example, if the bank were compelled to pay the thief by
Section 4-303, the bank would still be liable to the true owner under Section
3-603(1)-despite the payment it was compelled by Section 4-303 to make to
the thief.
Id. (emphasis added).
56 J. Fairfax Leary & Michael A. Schmitt, Some Bad News and Some Good News
from Articles Three and Four, 43 OHIO ST. L. J. 611 (1982). Professor Leary's recollection
is that "the practical banker appeared to be somewhat more concerned with the manner
in which the item is sent for collection rather than the nature of the item." He adds that:
In the late 1940's there were two distinct Federal Reserve Regulations in-
volved: Regulation G covering non-cash items, and Regulation J covering cash
items, as defined in those regulations. The regulations have now been com-
bined in the present Regulation J but the terms cash and non-cash remain
Id. at 630-31. Leary provides another clue on the immediacy of payment context and on
the nature of the payment media:
Well, the next thing we tried to do was to find a cutoff point for priorities, and
for the time when a bank changes from being a payor bank, in the check sys-
tem, to being a bank that has something to remit or has made some payment.
Id. (emphasis added). See supra note 25.
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for payment over the bank's counter. This method implemented
the policy that called for the paying bank to "pay now and in-
vestigate at leisure"; it was not customarily used in the pay-
ments of bank collection items, which were paid by the payor
bank's remittance of a draft drawn on another bank or by the
payor bank's sending or delivering its own cashier's check.
7
Thus the acceptances and certifications of section 4-303(1)(a)
are devices used by payor banks to pay for collection items.
They should not be confused with the items they pay for, in-
cluding such items as the accepted drafts of Banco Bamerindus
or Gotham.ss
Although the legislative history materials related to section
4-303 are minimal, the Report of the Subcommittee on Article 4
to the New York Clearing House Subcommittee on the Proposed
Uniform Commercial Code ("New York Report") and the opin-
ion of an article 4 draftsman are not inconsistent with the sug-
gested interpretation.89 After noting that the proposed text of
section 4-303 covered a period "before an item is finally paid
[and] during which the item nevertheless has priority of pay-
ment over any notice, stop order, legal process or valid set off,"
the New York Report referred to some difficulties in the pro-
posed text.9 0 Among these, was:
87 For the present media of remittance of payment for items used by banks, see the
text of UC.C. section 4-211 at supra note 20. For a case involving the use of a cashiers'
check in the payment of a letter of credit and an application of U.C.C. section 4-303 to
the immediate payment context suggested as the appropriate one by this writer, see
Tranarg C.A. v. Banca Commerciale Italiana, 90 Misc. 2d 829, 396 N.Y.S.2d 761 (Sup.
Ct. N.Y. County 1977). At the time an initial TRO had been served on the defendant
bank, the defendant corporation had made demand under the letter and the defendant
bank had issued its own official check to the correspondent bank and debited plaintiffs
account.
BAILEY & HAGEIORN, supra note 75, at S15-13-14. Bailey and Hagedorn reproduce
the text of California and Nevada's amendments to section 4-303. One of these amend-
ments, added to the list of cut off acts or events as item (f) states:
The item has been deposited or received for deposit for credit in an account of
a customer with the payor bank. "Bailey and Hagedorn, state that this amend-
ment is a return to the rule rejected by the U.C.C. draftsmen that final pay-
ment of an 'on us' item takes place for all practical purposes when the item is
deposited in the customer's account.
Id. at S15-14. Regardless of whether the amendment amounts to final payment for "all
practical purposes," the role of acceptances and certifications paying for such "on us"
items appears to have been diminished.
S"' See State of New York, Law Revision Comm., Report, Hearings on the Uniform
Commercial Code Vol. 1, 297, 318 (1954) [hereinafter New York Report].
90 Id. at 297 (emphasis added).
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If the bank has settled for an item by separate remittance in the form
of a draft, may it thereafter stop payment on that draft on the ground
that it had not "finally paid" the item for which the draft was given?
Would the bank not remain liable on its draft?
91
Walter D. Malcolm, an article 4 draftsman, testified during
the New York hearings on the adoption of article 4. He stated
that typically a remittance draft paying for a collection item was
mailed to the Federal Reserve Bank from which the collection
item was received. This mailing entailed various possible mo-
ments of final payment. Assume the decision to draw and for-
ward the draft was made by a rural New England Bank
("NEB") on a Monday. Then on Tuesday a draft was drawn on
a Boston bank and was mailed to the Federal Reserve Bank of
Boston ("FRB") for collection. The FRB received the draft on
Wednesday and presented it to the clearing house where credit
was given for the draft. From the standpoint of the "four legals",
it was unclear when such a draft was actually paid. By Mal-
colm's account, courts in the United States could have applied
at least seven different rules on when the item was paid: (1) the
moment that NEB made the decision to execute the remittance
and forward it to FRB; (2) the moment the bookkeeper at NEB
determined that there were enough funds to pay; (3) the mo-
ment the process of posting at NEB was completed; (4) the mo-
ment that NEB could no longer withdraw the remittance from
the mails; (5) the moment the draft was received by the FRB;
(6) the moment the draft was honored at the clearing house; and
(7) in the case of insolvency of the payor bank, the moment
when the presenting bank made the election on payment or non-
payment of the item.e2 Malcolm asserted that the rule, which
became section 4-303, reflected a policy determination such that
91 Id. at 298 (emphasis added). See also Letter from Robert H. Brome to Walter D.
Malcolm, one of Article 4's draftsmen in New York Report, supra note 89, at 343.44. In
the letter Brome pointed out that the customary manner of finally paying for non-cash
items was not to grant provisional credits (as was done with cash items) but by separate
remittance. It was not clear in the proposed draft whether these remittances could be
considered as final payments and, if not, whether they needed to be posted as required
for final payment. While Brome added that a properly informed court would consider
these remittances as final payments (reasoning that they constituted agreements in vari-
ation of code requirements) since such remittances were quite common, confusion should
be dispelled by the U.C.C.
92 Id. at 472.
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automatically when payment has been completed by the payor bank, a
debtor-creditor relationship arises ... the payor bank from that mo-
ment forward is indebted to the owner of the item for the amount of
the item. It will remit or it will account for that indebtedness through
the chain of banks, but basically, having charged the account of the
drawer from that moment forward it is indebted .... 03
Paton's Digest was one of the most influential sources of
pre-article 4 bank collections law. 4 Its description of the priority
dispute between a stop payment order and a payment of a col-
lection item through a remittance draft framed the issue consist-
ently with the above interpretation. Typically the priority prob-
lem arose when the drawee bank received from the collecting
bank, through the mail, a check drawn by one of the drawee
bank's customers. The drawee bank marked the check paid,
charged the drawer's account and issued its draft in payment to
the collecting bank. According to Paton's Digest, the manner in
which the drawee bank handled the check amounted to "an ac-
ceptance or payment of the check and constituted a full consum-
mation of the transaction initiated by the drawing of the check.
2295
In sum, the text, Official Comment and scant legislative his-
tory of section 4-303 indicate that acceptance under section 4-
303(1)(a) is a means of immediate or imminent payment used by
the payor bank in the article 4 collection chain to pay for collec-
13 Id. at 473 (testimony of Mr. Walter D. Malcolm) (emphasis added). The dispute
between drafters was not on whether U.C.C. sections 4-303 or 4-213, (its companion sec-
tion on final payment) should include cash-like means of payments given in payment of
collection items, such as cashiers' and certified checks and accepted drafts, but on
whether section 4-303 should adopt, among others, section 7 of the American Bankers
Association C'ABA") Code of Collections. This section, provided that "where an item is
received by mail by a solvent payor, it shall be deemed paid when the amount is finally
charged to the account of the maker or drawer." Id. According to Malcolm, the article 4
draftsmen did not see the reason for limiting the scope of sections 4-213 and 4-303 to
items received by mail by a solvent payor. In addition, they found other related provi-
sions in the ABA Collection Code to be too narrow and imprecise, especially those that
relied on the collecting bank's request or acceptance of an "irrevocable credit" for the
item. Id. at 475-76, quoting § 11, and referring to §§ 2, 9, 10, 13(2) & (3) of the ABA
Collection Code. The notion of final payment turned, according to Malcolm, on the col-
lecting bank's request or acceptance of an unconditional credit But c.f. Id. at 493-95
(Mr. Brome's reply).
"THohms B. PATON, 3 PATON'S DIGEST or LEGAL OPINIONS 1341 (Am. Bankers As-
soc., ed. 1940).
9B PATON, supra note 94, at 1341, quoting First National Bank of Portage v. Wiscon-
sin National Bank of Watertown 246 N.W. 593, 594 (Vis. 1933).
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tion items in that bank's possession. The acceptance referred to
in section 4-303(1)(a), however, is not the acceptance of the type
in Banco Bamerindus. The Banco Bamerindus acceptance was
not issued by Banco in payment of MMI's accepted time draft
or of any other article 4 item. Unlike a means of immediate pay-
ment, MMI's accepted time draft was executed in mid-August
1990 and was payable in late October 1990. In addition, neither
at the time of the injunction nor thereafter was MMI's accepted
time draft submitted for payment to Banco either directly by
MMI or by a collecting bank.
If All Service had not sought an injunction, several collec-
tion alternatives were available to MMI on October 20, 1990.
First, MMI could have negotiated the accepted draft to a bank
willing to give value for it and this negotiating bank or a subse-
quent one would have, at maturity, presented the acceptance for
payment to the acceptor bank. Second, MMI could have dis-
counted the draft with the accepting bank itself and this bank
could have retained the acceptance until maturity or it could
have renegotiated it. Third, MMI could have awaited the accept-
ance's due date and presented it for payment directly to the ac-
ceptor in New York or to its principal in Brazil. Fourth, it could
have left the acceptance in the hands of the accepting bank until
October 29, 1992. Finally, shortly before October 29, MMI could
have deposited the acceptance for collection with a collecting
bank and asked that it be forwarded for collection to the issuing
bank. Some of these alternatives, especially the last one, could
have become subject to section 4-303. At the time of the dis-
puted injunction, however, MMI had not chosen any collection
procedure that could have brought section 4-303 into play.
B. New York Decisional Law: First Commercial Bank v. Go-
tham Originals
1. Facts
The New York Court of Appeals in Gotham was faced with
a situation that was, in many respects, similar to that in Banco
Bamerindus26 Gotham Originals, a New York importer, pur-
chased shoes from Taiwanese manufacturers and obtained an ir-
revocable letter of credit from Bank Leumi in New York to pay
'a 64 N.Y.2d 287, 475 N.E.2d 1255, 1256-1258, 486 N.Y.S. 2d 715 (1985).
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for the shoes. This letter of credit designated Teng Shih Indus-
tries as beneficiary and First Commercial Bank of the Republic
of China ("First Commercial") as the advising bank. The trans-
ferable letter of credit for approximately $172,000 was trans-
ferred to an R. Bore International Inc. ("R. Bore"). The amount
of the transfer is not specified in the opinion, but one may infer
from the fact that R.Bore presented two drafts for $71,000 to
First Commercial that the transfer to R. Bore was at least for
that sum. First Commercial received R. Bore's two drafts for
$71,000 on September 10, 1981-five days after the credit ex-
pired. First Commercial detected this late presentation discrep-
ancy, but credited R. Bore's account with the amount of the let-
ter of credit, subject to the reservation that the issuing bank and
the applicant waive the discrepancy. Bank Leumi obtained the
applicant's waiver and on September 24, 1981 notified First
Commercial by letter that the drafts had been accepted and
would be paid on November 23, 1981. Before the time of pay-
ment, the applicant discovered that the merchandise was worth-
less, brought an action in New York County's supreme court
against the sellers and sought a TRO against Bank Leumi's
transfer of the letter of credit proceeds or any "moneys or assets
of the sellers." 9 Gotham Originals also sought orders attaching
the proceeds of R. Bore's drafts.
The applicant was granted the TRO by the New York court.
A special proceeding followed to determine adverse claims to
funds and assets held by the issuer of the letter of credit.3 One
adverse claimant was the applicant who had obtained the TRO.
The other was the advising bank. It alleged that it had paid or
negotiated the letter of credit draft.. The advising bank peti-
tioned to vacate the restraining and attachment orders and to
obtain a determination that U.C.C. section 4-303 controlled the
transaction, thereby requiring the issuing bank to pay. Following
a special term decision favorable to the applicant, the appellate
division held that section 4-303 applied and the attachment and
injunction were untimely; thus the issuing bank was obligated to
pay. This decision was appealed to the New York Court of
Appeals.
99
- Id. at 293, 475 N.E.2d at 1258, 486 N.Y.S.2d at 718.
1 Id.; Banco Bamerindus, 921 F.2d 32 (2d Cir. 1990).
92 64 N.Y.2d at 293, 475 N.E.2d at 1258, 486 N.Y.S.2d at 718.
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Considerable ambiguity exists about the court of appeals'
characterization of the advising bank's function as a negotiator
and on the nature of the issuing bank's acceptance in Gotham.
As in Banco Bamerindus, the characterization of the holder and
payee of the draft is critical for the application of sections 4-303
and 5-114. Hence, it is necessary to transcribe and evaluate the
court of appeals' characterizations:
Transferee-beneficiary ... negotiated to petitioner two drafts ...
payable on sight 60 days from date .... Petitioner paid for the drafts
in Taiwanese currency and credited the amounts to R. Bore's check-
ing account although it did so "under reserve" because the letter of
credit had expired on September 5, 1981. On September 21st, Bank
Leumi received from petitioner the two drafts, the required documen-
tation and transmittal letters and a request for payment of the drafts
on Gotham's letter of credit. Petitioner disclosed the discrepancy of
the expiration date, noted that it had negotiated under reserve and
requested advice as to when it could lift the reserve and make final
payment to R. Bore. Bank Leumi subsequently obtained a waiver of
the discrepancy ... and on September 24th it notified petitioner by
letter that the drafts had been accepted and that payment would be
made on November 23, 1981. After Bank Leumi had accepted the
drafts but before it paid them, Gotham instituted an action against
Teng Shih, R. Bore and the other seller manufacturers in the Su-
preme Court, New York County claiming that they had sold it worth-
less merchandise and charging them with fraud .... 100
2. The Ratio Decidendi of Gotham
a. The Status of First Commercial as a Negotiating Bank
The transcribed text first refers to petitioner-advising bank
as a negotiating bank.10 1 Immediately after, however, it refers to
First Commercial as a bank that paid for the drafts.10 Subse-
quent characterizations in the same paragraph add to the confu-
sion. At one point it appears that the payment made by First
Commercial when the drafts were presented to it was only provi-
sional because First Commercial is said to have requested au-
thority from Bank Leumi to make a final payment. 0 3 Yet later it







and not merely reimburse First Commercial for its paymentY2'
As if First Commercial's status as a holder of the drafts was not
sufficiently confused, the court of appeals added the following
characterization:
By purchasing signed drafts drawn under the letter of credit by the
transferee-beneficiary, and because of respondent issuing bank's ex-
press engagement in the letter of credit to honor drafts presented by a
negotiating bank, petitioner acquired rights against respondent bank,
as issuer, to the same extent as if it were named as beneficiary of the
credit."'
The New York Court of Appeals' characterization of First
Commercial as both a bank that "paid for the drafts" and as "a
negotiating bank . .. purchasing signed drafts" is contradic-
tory." 6 While advising banks often act as paying banks in such
cases, as was discussed earlier, the UCP sanctioned banking
practice is to nominate, i.e., expressly designate the advising
bank as a paying bank,0 7 and to leave the determination of doc-
ument compliance to the nominating, issuing or confirming
bank. When the advising bank acts as a paying bank and pays,
there is no need for negotiation. Payment extinguishes the issu-
ing and confirming banks' liability and leaves nothing to be ne-
gotiated. Since the court of appeals' statement of facts does not
refer to a payment nomination, instead referring to a clause in
the letter of credit enabling the advising bank's negotiation, one
must assume that First Commercial was not acting as a paying
bank when it credited R. Bore's account.
Negotiation, on the other hand, means different things in
letter of credit practice. Some banks not nominated to confirm,
negotiate or pay, refer to their examination of documents as a
negotiation whether such an examination was volunteered by
them or requested by the beneficiary. Other banks term their
examination of the documents, endorsement of beneficiary's
draft and delivery of the documents to the issuing or confirming
bank as a negotiation. These two purported negotiators act
merely as conduits for the presentation of documents to the is-
suing, confirming or paying banks neither give value for the
104 Id.





draft nor promise to do so. Most of the banks in international
letter of credit transactions use the term "negotiation" to signify
the purchase of documents from the beneficiary or from a bank
remitting the documents on the beneficiary's behalf. This nego-
tiation must be authorized in the credit."0 8 Depending upon
whether the negotiating bank is also a confirming bank and also
upon the place or market where the draft and documents are
purchased, the business relationship between a beneficiary and a
negotiating bank and the stage of the transaction, the purchase
may be with or without recourse to the beneficiary.109 When a
purchase is made without recourse, the negotiating bank as-
sumes the risk of rejection of the documents by the issuing or
confirming bank for not being in compliance with the terms of
the credit. In another, less common, version of negotiation,
banks examine the documents, notify the issuing or confirming
bank that the documents comply with the terms of the credit
and agree with the beneficiary that if the issuing or confirming
bank does not honor the credit, they will.110
It is not clear where First Commercial fits in the preceding
categories. It would be foolhardy to purchase or give value for
documents that contain a discrepancy as serious as a presenta-
tion beyond the expiration of the credit; the documents for
which value was given could, very possibly, be worthless. More-
over, it is highly doubtful whether a bank, aware of such an in-
firmity when purchasing the draft, could qualify as a holder in
due course of beneficiary's draft. Conversely, if all First Com-
mercial did was to provide R. Bore with a provisional credit sub-
ject to reversal of this credit when the applicant refused to waive
108 UCP art. 10(a)(iv).
209 See, e.g., UCP art. 10(b)(iv) (where the confirming bank is said to "negotiate
without recourse to drawers and/or bona fide holders, drafts . . . ."). Nowadays, true
negotiation is not readily available. Outside of the United States, some financial centers
in the Orient, such as Singapore, are known as negotiation centers. The relationship be-
tween the beneficiary and the negotiating bank is also a major factor in the manner and
frequency of negotiation. Finally, an accepted draft by a bank of known solvency is much
more easily negotiable than an unaccepted draft.
110 To eliminate the ambiguity of such varied meanings the proposed revision of the
UCP defines negotiation as giving value for the documents. Presumably a promise to
honor if the issuing or confirming bank do not, is the equivalent of giving value. See
Chamber of Commerce, Document No. 470-37/72, 5/5/1992. Article 10(b)(ii) provides
that: "Negotiation means the giving of value for the Draft(s) and /or documents(s) by
the negotiating bank. Mere examination of the documents without giving of value does
not constitute a negotiation." Id.
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the discrepancy, it would be acting essentially as a collecting
bank and not as a true negotiating bank.
If First Commercial became a negotiating bank "by
purchasing signed drafts drawn under the letter of credit by the
transferee-beneficiary," ' then the court of appeals would have
been justified in granting payment to First Commercial as a
holder in due course under section 5-114 of the U.C.C., regard-
less of the beneficiary's fraud. Had this been the basis for the
court of appeals' decision, letter of credit law would have re-
mained undisturbed and Banco Bamerindus could well have
found that an injunction is available against a fraudulent benefi-
ciary. The court of appeals, however, also concluded that First
Commercial "acquired rights against the respondent bank, as is-
suer, to the same extent as if it were named as beneficiary of
the credit.1 1 2 In letter of credit and negotiable instruments law,
the rights of a negotiating bank purchasing a draft are indepen-
dent of a beneficiary's rights.1 3 If such a negotiating bank only
acquired rights "to the same extent as if it were named as bene-
ficiary of the credit," it would be subject to personal and real
defenses by the issuing bank against the beneficiary. Accord-
ingly, if, for example, a credit was amended with a beneficiary's
consent and the amendment did not appear on the operative
credit instrument shown to the negotiating bank, a beneficiary's
failure to comply with the amendment could be raised by the
issuing bank as a defense against the negotiating bank even
though this bank was ignorant of the amendment. In addition,
the negotiating bank would be subject to the same setoff as a
beneficiary that owes money to the issuing or confirming bank
and, a fortiori, to real defenses such as fraud.114 As discussed in
Part I, the beneficiary's vulnerability to the issuing or confirm-
ing bank's personal and real defenses significantly affects the de-
termination of the moment of final payment to him. For if the
beneficiary is subject to defenses, such as amendment or nova-
tion of the credit, setoff, or fraud that comes about or is discov-
ered after the presentation of documents and acceptance of the
draft, final payment cannot be said to have taken place at the
, Gotham, 64 N.Y.2d at 296, 475 N.E.2d at 1260, 486 N.YS.2d at 720 (1985).
Id. (emphasis added).




time the draft was accepted. Indeed, Professor John Dolan reads
some decisions as suggesting that the "issuer's act of accepting
time drafts does not discharge its liability on the credit."' 5 No
true negotiating bank, then, would want to have rights "to the
same extent as if it were named as beneficiary of the credit."'1 "
What is even more confusing is that the Gotham court seemed
aware of this distinction. In the paragraph preceding the ques-
tionable characterization, it stated:
Thus, iP petitioner had taken the drafts under circumstances
which made it a holder in due course, it would have acquired greater
rights than the beneficiary and Bank Leumi would be obligated to
honor the drafts despite Gotham's allegations of fraud in the
transaction.
117
In conclusion, it is not clear from the court of appeals' char-
acterization whether "final payment" was made by First Com-
mercial on R. Bore's two drafts when First Commercial, acting
as a paying bank, provisionally or finally credited R. Bore's ac-
count, or whether final payment on the drafts was about to be
made by Bank Leumi when the accepted drafts were going to be
presented for payment by First Commercial. If final payment
took place at First Commercial books or counters, then the in-
junction against Bank Leumi was misdirected and was, in any
event, too late. If First Commercial was not a paying bank and
was a mere collecting bank for R. Bore as transferee of the
credit, final payment, from an article 5 and UCP standpoint,
could not have taken place until Bank Leumi paid the accept-
ance to R. Bore. Until the moment of presentation of the ac-
cepted drafts for final payment by the transferee or its agent for
collection, the issuing bank could have raised all its personal and
real defenses against R. Bore. Thus where the Gotham benefi-
ciary, transferee or its agent for collection are concerned, pay-
ment cannot be final when the acceptance of Bank Leumi was
issued.
115 JOHN F. DOLAN, THE LAW OF LEtRs OF CREDIT 2.09 n.143 (1984).
is Gotham, 64 N.Y.2d at 296, 475 N.E.2d at 1260, 486 N.Y.S.2d at 720.
117 Id. at 295, 475 N.E.2d at 1259, 486 N.Y.S.2d at 719.
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b. The Gotham Court Ambiguity: Did Bank Leumi Issue an
Acceptance? If So, Which Party Was Its Holder?
The New York Court of Appeals did not indicate whether
Bank Leumi's acceptance of R. Bore's time drafts was inserted
on the drafts or whether the accepted drafts were delivered to
the beneficiary or to the transferee of the credit. All the opinion
says is that Bank Leumi notified First Commercial by letter that
the drafts had been accepted and that payment would be made
sixty days or so later. If the original beneficiary had retained the
right to draw for a percentage of the credit, Bank Leumi would
have violated the terms of the credit if it accepted transferee's
drafts for the face amount of the credit. Such an acceptance
could have forced Bank Leumi to pay the same amount twice:
first, to the transferee, holder of the acceptance for the full
amount of the credit, and second, to the original beneficiary for
his share of the credit. For the same reason, Bank Leumi would
have been ill- advised to deliver an acceptance for the full
amount of the credit to the original beneficiary. In fact, the orig-
inal beneficiary should not have been given an acceptance even
for his share of the credit if his right to draw depended upon the
transferee's compliance with the credit, especially if the transfer
in question was one with "substitution of invoices." 1 8
Likewise, the Gotham court did not indicate whether the
original beneficiary had retained the right to draw and, if so, for
what percentage of the credit. If an original beneficiary retains a
right to draw for part of the credit amount and the credit, as in
this case, authorizes free negotiation, many issuing banks nomi-
nate themselves or another bank as the only banks empowered
to affect the transfer. As the exclusive transferring banks, they
retain the transferee's accepted draft until they receive all the
necessary documents to honor the credit, including the original
beneficiary's draft(s). This may explain why the Gotham court
did not indicate that Bank Leumi mailed the acceptance to R.
Bore. Yet as discussed in connection with Banco Bamerindus, if
the accepted draft was not delivered to its payee (the original
beneficiary or the transferees) or if the payee was not notified of
the acceptance, U.C.C. section 3-410 makes it clear that no oper-
ative acceptance existed.
11" See UCP art. 54(e) & (M.
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Moreover, if the court of appeals regarded as an acceptance
the letter sent by Bank Leumi to First Commercial indicating
that the drafts were accepted, it acted contrary to the express
language of U.C.C section 3-410. According to this provision, an
acceptance "must be written on the draft."'1 " As made clear by
the U.C.C. Official Comment, the "virtual" or "collateral accept-
ances" of sections 134 and 135 of the Negotiable Instruments
Law that preceded the U.C.C. are no longer enforceable. 2 ° Con-
sequently, Bank Leumi's letter to First Commercial is not an ac-
ceptance under U.C.C. sections 3-410 and 4-303. In the absence
of proof that a valid acceptance existed, and that it was exe-
cuted on an article 4 item, the Gotham letter of credit simply is
outside the scope of section 4-303.121
3. "Fixing" the Moment of Final Payment of a Transfera-
ble Credit
To apply U.C.C. section 4-303, the Gotham court had to es-
tablish when the final decision to pay R. Bore's drafts was made.
After referring to the principle that letters of credit are indepen-
dent from underlying transaction equities and that banks are
only concerned with documents and not with goods, 22 the court
of appeals proffered its own rule of finality of letter of credit
payments: "Thus, the issuer's obligation to pay is fixed upon
219 1982 U.C.C. § 3-410 cmt. 3. It made clear that this subsection adopted section 17
of the English Bills of Exchange Act which provides that the acceptance must be written
on the draft. It also adds that this sub-section
eliminates the original sections 134 and 135 providing for "virtual" acceptance
by a written promise to accept drafts to be drawn, and "collateral" acceptance
by a separate writing. Both have been anomalous exceptions to the policy that
no person is liable on an instrument unless his signature appears on it. Both
are derived from a line of early American cases decided at a time when difficul-
ties of communication, particularly overseas, might leave the holder in doubt
for a long period whether the draft was accepted. Such conditions have long
ceased to exist and the "virtual" or "collateral" acceptance is now almost en-
tirely obsolete. Good commercial and banking practice does not sanction ac-
ceptance by any separate writing because of the dangers and uncertainties aris-
ing when it becomes separated from the draft. The instrument is now
forwarded to the drawee for his acceptance upon it, or reliance is placed upon
the obligation of the separate writing itself, as in the case of the letter of
credit.
1982 U.C.C. § 3-410 cmt. 3.
120 Id.
121 See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
122 Gotham, 64 N.Y.2d at 294, 475 N.E.2d 1259, 486 N.Y.S.2d at 718.
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presentation of the drafts and the documents specified in the
credit .... ,,1 This rule ascribes serious legal consequences to
the concept of fixation of the obligation to pay, despite that con-
cept's uncertain meaning in letter of credit law and practice.
Neither bankers nor banking lawyers can confidently respond to
the question of what a bank has to do to "fix" its obligation to
pay a letter of credit. Does fixing an obligation to pay mean the
same thing as establishing the irrevocability of an issuance
under U.C.C. section 5-106?124 It would not seem so because the
U.C.C. establishment takes place during the phase of issuance of
the letter credit, while the fixing of the payment obligation
seems to take place after a beneficiary's compliance and during
the phase of payment.
Does fixing the obligation to pay, then, mean determining
the facial compliance of the documents with the terms and con-
ditions of the credit, thereby rendering the bank's promise un-
conditional? This could be the meaning of "fixing," but if such
were its meaning, "to fix an obligation to pay" would fall consid-
erably short of final payment. As indicated earlier, the uncondi-
tionality of the bank's promise does not preclude the bank from
retaining its personal as well as real defenses against the benefi-
ciary holder of the draft.
12a
If the court of appeals was attempting to pave the way for
the application of U.C.C. section 4-303,12o one may surmise that
"to fix an obligation to pay" refers to the moment when the final
decision to pay the credit is made. Yet if this is the meaning of
the court's rule, then it finds no support from the letter of credit
principle of independence. The principle of independence or ab-
straction is not a "rule of traffic"-it does not govern the time
when a credit is deemed established or finally paid. It is a rule
intended to guide the proper drafting and interpretation of let-
ter of credit terms and conditions and to establish the unavaila-
bility of defenses related to underlying transactions.12 7 Thus it
does not follow from a directive on how to draw up a credit or
how to examine documents that the obligation to pay is finally
123 Id. (emphasis added).
124 N.Y.U.C.C. § 5-106 (McKinney 1991).
125 See supra text accompanying notes 41-42.
121 See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
12 Kozolchyk, supra note 17, at 113-14.
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fixed upon at any given time, even if the time is that of presen-
tation of conforming documents. Aside from the lack of connec-
tion between independence and final payment, the decision to
make final payment may have to be made at a time after the
presentation of documents or it may not have to be made at all,
despite the presentation of documents. As discussed earlier, fol-
lowing the presentation of documents a credit may be amended
with beneficiary's consent, or the bank may successfully raise
the defense of fraud against the beneficiary. Finally, the court of
appeals' fixation of final payment at the time of presentation of
complying documents is particularly unsuited for transferable
credits because these credits often entail different presentations
by different parties. Presentation of documents by a transferee
is often only the first step in "fixing" the issuing or confirming
bank's obligation of payment. If the credit provided for a trans-
fer in which the original beneficiary retained the right to substi-
tute his invoices for those of the transferee, the original benefi-
ciary would still have to substitute his own invoice and possibly
other documents before the issuing bank could begin to examine
the documents required by the credit, let alone make the final
decision to pay it. If the credit did not provide for the right to
substitute invoices and the original beneficiary retained the right
to draw for the beneficiary's share of the credit, his right to draw
would not be "fixed" until he submitted his invoice and
whatever additional documentation was required to the transfer-
ring bank.
The New York Court of Appeals did not seem to grasp the
distinction between transferable credits and credits where drafts
are freely negotiable. According to the Gotham court, "[b]y issu-
ing a letter of credit, the issuer undertakes an obligation to pay
the beneficiary, or his transferee if the letter of credit is negotia-
ble, from the account of the customer." 128 Strictly speaking,
there is no such thing as a "negotiable" credit. 129 Therefore, con-
trary to the court of appeals' statement, a transferee cannot de-
mand honor merely because the letter of credit is "negotiable,"
i.e., it contains a clause enabling payment to a bona fide holder
of a beneficiary's draft(s). The court of appeals' confusion may
128 Gotham, 64 N.Y.2d at 294, 475 N.E.2d at 1258, 486 N.Y.S.2d at 718 (emphasis
added).
129 KOZOLCHYK, supra note 63, at 519-54.
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account for its unwarranted equation between the decision to
make final payment on the credit and the transfer of the credit.
The transfer of the credit takes place at an earlier time than
the decision to make final payment on the transferable credit. A
decision to make final payment on a transferable credit presup-
poses that the following transfer-related steps were completed:
(1) notification by the issuing bank to the transferring bank (if
this is a bank other than the issuing bank) of the issuance of a
transferable credit to be transferred by the transferring bank(s);
(2) request by the beneficiary for a transfer; (3) notification to
the beneficiary by the transferring bank that a transferable
credit has been issued in its favor for a certain amount or per-
centage of the face amount of the original credit upon specified
terms and conditions; (4) notification of the transfer by the
transferring bank to each transferee; (5) presentation by the
transferee to the transferring bank of complying documents; (6)
verification by the transferring bank of the transferee's docu-
mentary compliance; (7) substitution of invoices and/or presen-
tation of complying documents by the original beneficiary and
remaining transferees; and (8) decision by the transferring bank
to make final payment on the transferable portions of the credit.
Since R. Bore had, presumably, been notified of the transfer by
First Commercial acting, apparently, as a transferring bank,
steps 7 and 8 had not been completed when the TRO was issued.
If, however, the TRO also included the transfers to other shoe
manufacturers-transferees that had not yet presented their doc-
uments, then steps 2 through 8 may well have had to be com-
pleted before final payment could be made to those transferees
and the original beneficiary. Accordingly, if what the TRO
sought to prevent was the transfer (as contrasted with the final
payment) of the credit, it had to arrive at an earlier time than
the time when the decision to pay the credit was "fixed."
4. The Logic in Support of the Application of Article 4
a. A Faulty Syllogism
The key issue raised by the parties in Gotham was which
U.C.C. article to apply, article 5 on letters of credit or article 4
on bank deposits and collections. Petitioner First Commercial
based its claim of untimeliness of the injunction on U.C.C. sec-
tion 4-303(1)(a), while respondent Gotham Originals contended
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that the TRO was timely under section 5-114(2)(b) because the
order was served upon the bank before it honored the drafts.
The court of appeals acknowledged that the U.C.C's definition
of honor is "to pay or to accept and pay" 130 and that under this
definition and section 5-114(2) the TRO was timely. However,
the court of appeals agreed with the appellate division and
found the order untimely under U.C.C. section 4-303 because
Bank Leumi had accepted the drafts before the arrival of the
TRO. "I
The court of appeals provided various reasons to apply arti-
cle 4. First, it justified its reliance on article 4 because the issuer
of the letter of credit was a bank. The court set forth its reason-
ing in a footnote:
Article 4 of the Uniform Commercial Code governs bank deposits and
collections and applies to this case because the issuer of the letter of
credit was a bank. Letters of credit may be issued by parties other
than banks, however, and Article 4 of the Uniform Commercial Code
and part III of this opinion would not apply to such persons.13 1
This justification rests on a faulty syllogism. The court of ap-
peals' major premise is that article 4 governs "bank deposits and
collections" and thus concludes that article 4 applies because the
issuer of the letter of credit is a bank. Yet, what happened to
"deposits and collections" and to the other antecedents of the
court of appeals' major premise? Unless a transaction encom-
passes a deposit or a collection and the banks involved are part
of the collection and payment stream, the mere fact that the is-
suer of the promise is a bank does not subject the transaction in
question to article 4. After all, banks issue promises of payment
or extend credits in connection with each and every U.C.C. arti-
cle transaction. Clearly, not all these U.C.C. articles are dis-
placed when a bank issues the promise of payment. At best,
then, the presence of an issuing bank could be a necessary, but
not sufficient, condition to apply article 4.
"' See U.C.C. § 1-201(21).




b. The Search for a Necessary and Sufficient Condition for
the Application of Article 4
To be persuasive, the court of appeals had to demonstrate
that the U.C.C. or related law provided the necessary and suffi-
cient basis to apply article 4. It attempted to do so as follows:
Section 4-102 of the Code provides that if the provisions of article 4
conflict with those of article 3 then article 3 shall govern .... It con-
tains no similar provision with respect to a conflict with the provisions
of article 5 nor does any section of article 5 deal with the conflict. The
controlling language must be found in section 4-303 (1) ... It states
that any legal process served upon a payor bank "whether or not ef-
fective under other rules of law" to terminate or suspend the bank's
duty to pay the item comes too late ... if the bank has previously
accepted the item .... section 5-114 contains no similar provision.
Indeed, the Legislature made clear that article 5 and the UCP do not
control every aspect of the transaction that involves a letter of credit
when it provided that article 5 was intended to deal with some but
not all of the rules and concepts of letters of credit ... Accordingly,
section 4-303 by its terms, supersedes section 5-114 .... I"
132 64 N.Y.2d at 295, 475 N.E.2d at 1260, 486 N.Y.S.2d at 720 (emphasis in original).
At this point the court of appeals cited U.C.C. sections 3-413 and 3-410(1) on accept-
ances and United States Rail Co. v. Wiener, 169 A. D. 561, 155 N.Y.S. 425 (1915). The
text of section 3-410(1) as interpreted by the Court of Appeals (before the 1990 revision)
is as follows: "Acceptance is the drawee's signed engagement to honor the draft as
presented. It must be written on the draft, and may consist of his signature alone. It
becomes operative when completed by delivery or notification." N.Y.U.C.C. § 3410(1)
(emphasis added).
The first three subsections of section 3-409 of the Official Uniform Commercial Code
of 1990 correspond to former section 3410. The relevant language presently in force is
found in the 1990 version of section 3409(a):
Acceptance means the drawee's signed agreement to pay a draft as presented.
It must be written on the draft, and may consist of the drawee's signature
alone. Acceptance may be made at any time and becomes effective when notifi-
cation pursuant to instructions is given or the accepted draft is delivered for
the purpose of giving rights on the acceptance to any person.
N.Y.U.C.C. § 3409(a) (McKinney 1991) (emphasis added). As is readily apparent from
these two texts, the essential requirement of insertion or incorporation of the acceptance
on the draft remains in force. Section 3413 underwent a more substantial revision, al-
though the principle of primary liability (as contrasted with the secondary liability of the
drawer of the draft) remained the same. The text in force at the time of Judge Simon's
decision stated: "The maker or acceptor engages that he will pay the instrument accord-
ing to its tenor at the time of his engagement.... ." N.Y.U.C.C. § 3413(1) (McKinney
1982). The 1990 version of section 3413(a) states in relevant part* "An acceptor of a
draft is obliged to pay the draft (i) according to its terms at the time it was accepted,
even though the acceptance states that the draft is payable 'as originally drawn' or
equivalent terms. . . ." U.C.C. § 3-413 (1990).
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The "controlling language" in section 4-303 referred to by
the court falls considerably short of being the necessary and suf-
ficient condition for the displacement of article 5 by article 4. As
was discussed in connection with Banco Bamerindus, the payor
bank referred to in section 4-303 is an article 4 bank-it is the
last bank in the collection chain of article 4 items, not the issu-
ing or confirming bank of a letter of credit, although in some
instances both capacities may merge. Where a draft is sent for
collection and the collecting bank presents it as a collection item
to the issuing bank-payor and the issuing bank then pays in
cash or issues an acceptance or certification as a means of pay-
ment for the draft-item, such an issuing bank-payor could be
subject to section 4-303. However, these were not the facts of
Gotham or Banco Bamerindus.
In the absence of a necessary and sufficient basis, the Go-
tham court attempted to justify the application of article 4 by
means of subsidiary arguments. However, these attempts fall
victim to the same faulty logic as their predecessors. First, the
court argued that
the legislature enacting Article 5 made it clear that Article 5 and the
UCP do not control "every aspect of a transaction that involves a let-
ter of credit" when it provided that Article 5 was intended to deal
with "some but not all of the rules and concepts of letters of credit."
Accordingly, Section 4-303 by its terms supersedes 5-114 .... "13
Despite the court's use of "accordingly," it does not follow that
because the legislature did not intend article 5 to be exhaustive
it must have intended article 5 rules to be displaced by rules in
other articles. It is one thing for a court to fill in legislative gaps
with general principles of law or of equity or with certain statu-
tory or customary rules. It is completely different for a court to
contend that although an article 5 rule exists, such as section 5-
114, it should be disregarded in an article 5 transaction because
section 4-303 also exists.
C. The Public Policy of Gotham
Finally, the New York Court of Appeals attempted to but-




tress its logic with "important policy considerations. "1 The
main consideration was that bankers' acceptances are regularly
sold to obtain financing before the date of maturity of the ac-
ceptance in "a market sanctioned by the Federal Reserve
Board."1 5 The Gotham court ominously concluded that "[i]f the
courts intervene to enjoin issuing banks from paying drafts they
have previously accepted they seriously undermine this
market."
13 6
The court of appeals mistakenly connected the drafts in
First Commercial's hands with a Federal Reserve Board "sanc-
tioned" market. Assuming that a valid and operative acceptance
was created by Bank Leumi, nothing in Gotham indicates that
Bank Leumi's purported acceptance ever entered the market
sanctioned by the Federal Reserve Board. The sanctioned ac-
ceptance market comprises discounts by a Federal Reserve Bank
and purchases of acceptances by bank members of the Federal
Reserve System. This market presupposes a sale of the accept-
ance by the beneficiary or the collecting bank to a bank member
of the Federal Reserve System. Thus, an acceptance that re-
mains with the accepting bank, the beneficiary or the collecting
bank has not entered the Federal Reserve sanctioned acceptance
market. Moreover, to enter this market by means of a discount,
rediscount or purchase, the acceptance must fulfill certain re-
quirements, found in section 13 of the Federal Reserve Act:
Upon the indorsement of any of its member banks, with a waiver of
demand, notice and protest by such bank... any Federal reserve
bank may discount notes, drafts and bills of exchange arising out of
actual commercial transactions;... the Federal Reserve Board to have
the right to determine or define the character of the paper thus eligi-
ble for discount, within the meaning of this Chapter."
-- Id. at 297, 475 N.E.2d at 1261, 486 N.Y.S.2d at 721.
135 Id. (emphasis added).
11 Id. (emphasis added).
137 Federal Reserve Act, ch. 6, § 13 (1913). In the event of a rediscount, the same
section provides:
Any Federal Reserve Bank may discount acceptances which are based on the
importation or exportation of goods and which have a maturity time at the
time of discount of no more than three months, and indorsed by at least one
member bank. The amount of acceptances so discounted shall at no time ex-
ceed one -half the paid-up capital stock and surplus of the bank for which the
rediscounts were made. The aggregate of such notes and bills bearing the sig-
nature or indorsement of any one person, company, firm or corporation redis-
counted for any one bank shall at no time exceed ten percentum of the
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A foreign bank's acceptance will enter the Federal Reserve sanc-
tioned market only if the issuing entity was a United States
branch or agency of the foreign bank.138 While the Federal Re-
serve Bank may receive deposits from and discount paper en-
dorsed by any branch or agency of the foreign bank in the same
manner and to the same extent as any member bank, such a
branch or agency must maintain the required reserves with the
Federal Reserve Bank. 39 Bank Leumi's acceptance, therefore,
would have to meet several intrinsic and extrinsic requirements
before it could enter the Federal Reserve System sanctioned
market. The Gotham opinion is silent on whether these require-
ments were met by Bank Leumi's purported acceptance. In the
absence of specific findings, it would be unwarranted to assume
that the issuer of the acceptance met these requirements.
Furthermore, even if the acceptance met the requirements
for entrance in the Federal Reserve sanctioned market, there
would be no reason for applying U.C.C. section 4-303.140 U.C.C.
section 5-114(2)(a) was specifically designed for the protection of
holders in due course of a beneficiary's draft, such as the mem-
ber bank that purchased or the Federal Reserve Bank that dis-
counted or re-discounted R. Bore's drafts. 4 ' If the court of ap-
peals had in mind a market in which drafts were not purchased
or discounted by members of the Federal Reserve System but
merely were retained by issuing banks, beneficiaries or their
agents, it is difficult to see why this market should be given any
greater protection than that afforded by U.C.C. article 5. After
all, if a beneficiary is concerned about what might happen from
the time a bank accepts a draft to the time it pays for it, article
5 and the UCP provide the beneficiary with easy alternatives.
First, he may insist on a credit payable upon presentation of a
"sight" draft.142 Second, if he wishes to extend credit to his
unimpaired capital and surplus of said bank ....
Id. (emphasis added).
18 The Federal Reserve Act, as amended in 1978, refers only to transactions be-
tween a Federal Reserve Bank and a branch or agency of a foreign bank. See 12 U.S.c. §
347, Publ. L. 95-369, § 7(b), 92 Stat. 621, Sept. 17, 1978.
139 Id.
140 See supra note 25.
1 See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
142 See UCP art. 10(a)(1); U.C.C. § 5-114(4)(b) (as amended in 1977) (limiting the
issuer's time of rejection to "three banking days following its receipt of the documents").
See also UCP art. 16(c) (imposing a "reasonable time" limitation).
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buyer and to protect himself against an unwarranted injunction,
he may agree to a time letter of credit, but will negotiate his
draft with a true negotiating bank as soon as possible. The true
negotiating bank will qualify as a holder in due course and, con-
trary to what First Commercial was prepared to do with R.
Bore's account in Gotham, would not seek recourse against the
beneficiary or transferee.
The remaining beneficiaries in such a non-Federal Reserve
sanctioned market, then, would be (A) a good faith beneficiary
who wishes to take the risk of holding the draft until maturity in
exchange for not having to pay a negotiation commission and
fee, and (B) a bad faith beneficiary who knows he has commit-
ted fraud but counts on Gotham and Banco Bamerindus to ob-
tain his ill-gotten payment. Public policy does not require that
these beneficiaries receive additional protection under article 5.
Beneficiary A is not only assuming a risk for a consideration he
deems significant, but also, if the documents are genuine and he
has not committed fraud, the issuing or the confirming bank will
eventually have to pay its accepted draft. In addition, Benefi-
ciary A stands to recover damages from the applicant, especially
when most courts in the United States require the posting of a
bond large enough to cover precisely the damages suffered as a
result of the delayed payment.1 43 Beneficiary, on the other hand,
does not deserve any protection beyond that afforded by the
criminal justice system.
Another case helps to clarify the public policy of protecting
payees of letter of credit-like promises. In Da Silva v. Sand-
ers,'4 the court considered an attempt by a bank that issued a
cashier's check to dishonor it on grounds of fraud or no consid-
eration. Unlike Gotham and Banco Bamerindus, however, in Da
Silva the payee of the cashier's check was innocent of fraud. Af-
ter describing the split of authority on the issuing bank's liabil-
ity toward payees on fraudulently obtained cashiers' checks,14
the district court expressed its preference for protecting the
payee, even though not the holder in due course of the cashier's
1'3 See Rockwell International Systems, Inc. v. Citibank N.A., 719 F.2d 583, 589-90
(2d Cir. 1983).
144 600 F. Supp. 1008 (D.D.C. 1984).
145 Id. at 1011.
1992]
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
check, against the "four legals" of U.C.C. section 4-303.148 The
policy behind its choice was "to permit the continued expansion
of commercial practices through custom and usage, "147 especially
when cashiers' checks have come to be viewed as cash in the
marketplace. Despite its alignment with the "cash like" view of
cashiers' checks-a view which is not without sound detrac-
tors-the district court warned that:
This is not the case where the payee of the cashier's check deals di-
rectly with the bank and engages in some fraud to obtain issuance of
the check from the payor bank or there has been a lack of considera-
tion running from the payee that deals directly with the payor bank
.... Under such circumstances, several courts have noted that "strong
considerations of public policy favoring negotiability and reliability of
cashiers" checks are not present and therefore a bank may refuse
payment.
1 48
One of the nation's most respected regulators of bankers'
acceptances, Mr. Walker Todd with the Federal Reserve Bank of
Cleveland, agrees with Da Silva's warning and with its analo-
gous application to bankers' acceptances. 14 9 According to Todd,
it is appropriate for bank examiners to require that acceptances
be counted as liabilities outstanding of the accepting bank from
the moment that "the acceptance hits the paper." 150 A bank ex-
aminer concerned with a realistic assessment of the likelihood of
liability is well advised to count the acceptances left in the pos-
session or control of the beneficiary as outstanding liability.
However, the function of an adjudicator in court is different
than that of a bank examiner. A court must determine the par-
ties' rights and duties at the time of trial. Todd agrees with this
writer that from a judicial vantage point:
As between the bank and the beneficiary, their legal status (i.e. their
rights and duties) does not change as long as the acceptance remains
with the beneficiary or subject to his control. Thus, from a regulatory
standpoint, the banks' liabilities outstanding cannot increase as long
as the accepted draft is in the hands of the beneficiary or in the pos-
148 See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
Da Silva, 600 F. Supp. at 1013.
148 Id. at 1013 n.13 (emphasis added).
148 Telephone interview with Walker Todd, Esq., Assistant General Counsel and Re-




session of the bank, and subject to no third party's instructions.""
The judicial and regulatory distinction between negotiated
and non-negotiated acceptances, or acceptances that remain
with the beneficiary or his collecting agent and those in the
hands of a holder in due course, reveals the misdirection of the
New York Court of Appeals' public policy justification. The
same distinction that Todd and this writer draw prevails in the
law of Europe's major financial centers.152
D. A Brief Comparative Law Excursus
Some of Europe's most respected and influential commer-
cial and banking lawyers characterized Banco Bamerindus and
Gotham as contrary to their own laws. 153
1. England
Professor Roy Goode of Oxford University in England noted
that under English law, once a draft is presented and accepted,
the claim on the letter of credit is replaced by a claim on the
draft governed by negotiable instruments law.'" Under English
negotiable instruments law a sharp distinction is drawn between
151 Id.
152 See infra notes 153-75 and accompanying text.
2'3 These opinions were obtained during two meetings attended by this writer dur-
ing the summer of 1992. The first meeting was of the International Chamber of Com-
merce Working Group for the revision of the UCP and took place in Rome from August
10-13, 1992. The Banco Bamerindus and Gotham decisions were discussed with Profes-
sor Salvatore Maccarone of the University of Rome, Vice President of the ICC Banking
Commission and Representative of the Italian Bankers Association for the Revision of
the UCP, and with Joachim Weichbrodt, Legal Counsel and Syndikus for the Dresdner
Bank, and German Representative to the ICC Banking Commission and for the revision
of the UCP. The second meeting was of the International Academy of Commercial and
Consumer Law and it took place in Stockholm from August 18-23, 1992. In Stockholm
the above mentioned decisions were discussed with Professor Roy Goode, Norton Rose
Professor of English Law at St John's College, Oxford, Professor Jean Stoufilet, Honor-
ary Dean and Professor of Commercial and Banking Law at Clermont Ferrand and Uni-
versity of Paris, and with Professor Dr. W. Frhr. von Marschall, Director of the Institut
far Internationales Privatrecht und Rechtsvergleichung at Bonn University. (Text on file
with the Brooklyn Law Review and with the Documentation Center at the University of
Arizona Foreign Law Library Documentation Center of the International Academy of
Commercial and Consumer Law.).
15 Letter from Roy Goode, Norton Rose Professor of English Law, St. John's Col-
lege, Oxford, England, to Professor Boris Kozolchyk, College of Law, University of Ari-
zona (Sept. 9, 1991) (on fie with the Brooklyn Law Review).
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a holder in due course and other holders. 5' This distinction ap-
plies to holders of letters of credit drafts as well:
Suppose that by reason of fraud in the transaction, it (the accepting
bank) never had a liability to pay against the documents. Can it not
be said that the supposed value failed and that the beneficiary as orig-
inal holder is precluded from enforcing payment against the instru-
ment? .... Obviously the argument could not be advanced against a
holder in due course. But why cannot it be advanced against the origi-
nal holder who was, ex hipothesi, the fraudulent beneficiary purport-
ing to give value (discharge of his claim on the letter of credit) when
in fact he gave none?1""
2. France
Professor Jean Stoufflet of the Universities of Clermont Fer-
rand and Paris, France also concluded that the acceptance, once
created, is subject to negotiable instruments law. Like English
law, French negotiable instruments law provides that neither the
applicant nor the acceptor-bank may raise the defense of fraud
against the holder in due course of the acceptance. 157 Yet if the
155 Id.
188 Id.
187 If the draft is in the hands of a holder in due course (for example the bank
that has discounted it), this holder is protected by the principle of unavailabil-
ity of defenses set forth in article 121 of the French Commercial Code (derived
from the Geneva Convention of 1930). No defense derived from the underlying
transaction, can be raised, including the defense of fraud ... In contrast, if the.
holder is a party to the underlying transaction, the defenses of lack of perform-
ance and other defenses grounded on this transaction remain available and will
justify the refusal of payment of the draft... It follows, that if the draft in
question was accepted not by a bank but by the buyer himself, fraud may be
invoked and an injunction is certainly possible under French law... Would
this [conclusion] be different because the bank was the acceptor of the draft?
In my opinion, fraud should equally paralyze the payment claim y the seller for
two reasons. In reality, fraud vitiates the entire transaction: The commercial
transaction and the banking transaction [the letter of credit agreement]. The
rule "fraud corrupts everything" applies .... I would add that the [benefi-
ciary's] commercial performance is the counterpart (consideration) for the
bank's acceptance. In reality, in a letter of credit transaction the bank pays a
buyer's debt to the seller, even though the peculiar mechanism of the letter of
credit creates a certain level of abstraction. At that moment, the fraud affect-
ing the commercial performance is a valid basis to refuse payment of the draft
if payment, it ought to be repeated, is claimed by the seller himself, [the] au-
thor of the fraud, and not by a holder in due course.
Letter from Jean Stouffiet, University of Clermont Terrand and University of Paris to
Professor Boris Kozolchyk, University of Arizona, College of Law 3-4 (Sept. 16, 1992) (as
translated by author)(on file with the Brooklyn Law Review).
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holder of the acceptance is a party to the underlying transaction,
the defense of lack of performance "and other defenses
grounded on this transaction remain available and will justify
the refusal of payment of the draft."""' Unquestionably, if the
acceptor were the buyer himself, French law would allow him to
enjoin the seller's collection of the draft. Under French law the
same result would be obtained if the bank were the acceptor be-
cause under French law "fraud corrupts everything": a benefi-
ciary's performance is ultimately the consideration for the
bank's acceptance. Accordingly, under French law the fraud that
vitiates the beneficiary's performance is a valid basis to refuse
payment of the draft when payment is claimed by the seller-
author of the fraud, and not by a holder in due course."' Profes-
sor Stouffiet also questions whether an acceptance was ever cre-
ated by Banco in Banco Bamerindus, especially if the draft was
retained by the bank.
16 0
3. Germany
Professor Wolfgang von Marschall and banking lawyer Joa-
chim Weichbrodt agree that Banco Bamerindus and Gotham are
contrary to German law.16 According to Professor von Mar-
schall, it is generally accepted in German law that the issuing
bank may refuse to honor a letter of credit in the case of actual
fraud by the beneficiary.16 2 The latest edition of J. Zahn's au-
thoritative commentary on letter of credit law, however, main-
tains that the buyer-applicant cannot enjoin the issuing bank
once that bank has accepted the beneficiary's draft. 0 3 Professor
158 Id.
159 Id.
110 In Professor Stoufflet's words: "After its acceptance, the draft was not immedi-
ately sent to the beneficiary but was retained by the bank. Could it not be maintained
that until the restitution of the draft to the beneficiary that there was no real accept-
ance?" Id. at 3.
101 Letter from Wolfgang F. von Marschall, Direktor, Institut Fur Internationale3
Privatrecht und Rechtsvergleihung to Professor Boris Kozolchyk, University of Arizona,
College of Law (Sept. 8, 1992) (on file with the Brooklyn Law Review).
16 See id. For a survey and analysis of German decisions enjoining presumed fraud-
ulent beneficiaries of bank guarantee drafts or demands for payment, see Boris
Kozolchyk, Bank Guarantees and Letters of Credit: Time for Return to the Fold, 11 U.
PA. J. INTL Bus. L. 1, 44-50 (1989).
153 ZAHN, supra note 45, at 234-36. The justification for this viewpoint seems to be
that once the acceptance is executed the letter of credit relationship (Ahkreditiu-
verhaltnis) ceases to exist and thus there is nothing to enjoin. This is a mistaken concep-
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von Marschall suggests a possible explanation of Zahn's view-
point by restricting the unavailability of the injunction to fraud
"with regard to the letter of credit.' 16 4 Arguably such a restric-
tion would not preclude an injunction if the fraud pertains to
the underlying transaction. Whatever the scope of Zahn's sug-
gested restriction, Professor von Marschall asserts that under
the Geneva Convention for Bills of Exchange and Promissory
Notes (as ratified by Germany)'65 and under the more recent
Convention on International Bills of Exchange and Promissory
Notes ("UNCITRAL"), 6  the fraudulent beneficiaries in Banco
Bamerindus and Gotham would be subject to an injunction.16 7
Weichbrodt points out that German courts and commenta-
tors overwhelmingly maintain that the first holder of the draft
who is also the payee in the underlying transaction cannot avail
himself of Article 17 of the Geneva Convention and of the Ger-
man bill of exchange law. 68 This Article prevents "persons sued
on the bill of exchange" from raising defenses against holders of
the draft based upon their relations with the drawer or previous
holders.6 " Article 17, therefore, would not apply to the benefi-
ciaries in Banco Bamerindus and Gotham and these benefi-
ciaries would be subject to the defense of fraud or to a fraud-
based injunction, provided that fraud was clearly established by
tion of the extinction of letter of credit liability in general and with respect to transfera-
ble-negotiable credits in particular. See supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text.
:4 See von Marschall's Letter, supra note 161, at 1.
101 Convention Providing a Uniform Law for Bills of Exchange and Promissory
Notes, Signed at Geneva, June 7, 1930, 143 L.N.T.S. 257 (1933-34) ("Geneva Conven-
tion"). The Conventions adopted by the League of Nations included a uniform law for
bills of exchange and promissory notes and two additional conventions for the settlement
of conflict of laws and on stamp laws on bills of exchange and promissory notes. Among
the states that ratified the three Geneva conventions were Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Den-
mark, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Monaco, Nether-
lands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Soviet Union, Sweden and Switzerland.
lea See Report of the Secretary General, UNCITRAL Document A/CN.9/281, Apr.
23, 1986 (precedes the final adoption). On the UNCITRAL convention, see Wolfgang von
Marschall, UNCITRAL's Proposed International Bill of Exchange, 1987 AIz. J. OF INT.
CoMP. L. 6 (1987).
1'7 See von Marschall's Letter, supra note 161.
1e8 Letter from Syndicus Joachim G. Weichbrodt to Professor Boris Kozolchyk, Uni-
versity of Arizona, College of Law (Aug. 21, 1992) (on file with the Brooklyn Law
Review).
... Article 17 of the Geneva Convention, as ratified by Germany, provides: "Persons
sued on a bill of exchange cannot set up against the holder defenses founded on their
personal relation with the drawer or with previous holders, unless the holder in acquiring
the bill has knowingly acted to the detriment of the debtor." Id.
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what German courts and commentators refer to as "liquid
proof' ("liquide beweise").17 °
4. Italy
Professor Salvatore Maccarone of Rome University agrees
with the preceding opinions. He points out that under Italian
law, as with the law of other Geneva Convention countries, only
when the first holder or payee endorses the draft to a third party
does the obligor's promise become independent from the under-
lying transaction and subject to the special regime of negotiable
instruments law defenses.17 1 In other words, vis-a-vis the payee
or first holder (the "immediate" party in the relationship obli-
gor-payee or first holder), the undertaking of the obligor (ac-
ceptor of the draft) remains the same.1 72 Thus defenses such as
error, duress or fraud cannot be raised against a remote holder
(holder in due course), but may be raised against the immediate
holder. Moreover, according to the prevailing view, the defense
of fraud may be raised against a bad faith holder (not necessa-
rily the first holder) who, although not the author or perpetrator
of the fraud, knew of the fraud when acquiring the draft.
17
1
Under Italian law the reason for extending the availability of the
fraud defense is that knowledge of fraud undermines the very
170 See Weichbrodt's Letter, supra note 168. The following decisions and comments
submitted by Weichbrodt illustrate the vulnerability of the payee or first holder of the
accepted draft against defenses personal to the obligor as well as those arising from the
underlying transaction in German decisional law and commentary.
15) "Against the payee or direct taker, the obligor can raise all objections, and
it does not matter whether they are based on [lack of] formality or [they are]
personal or real objections. . . [provided] he is not a holder in due course..."
WOLFGANG HEFERMEHL & ADOLF BAULMACH, Wechselgesetz und Scheckgesetz
par.67 (1984). For an illustration of the prevailing judicial attitude, see BGH,
Urt. v. 30.1. 1986- II ZR 257/85 (OLG Stuttgart) (holding that a German buyer
who has accepted a draft for the payment of the purchase price of goods is able
to raise against the seller and first holder of the draft the defense of insuffi-
ciency of consideration (unless otherwise agreed by him). This defense can also
be raised against a third party who has taken the draft in payment of the
buyer's purchase price.
Id.
171 Letter from Professor Salvatore Maccarone to Professor Boris Kozolchyk, Uni-
versity of Arizona, College of Law (Sept. 14, 1992) (on file with the Broohlyn Law
Review).
172 But see Maccarone's Letter, supra note 171 (citing a contrary, minority point of
view among Italian scholars).
173 See Maccarone's Letter, supra note 171, at 4.
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notion of bona fide acquisition. 174 This defense, therefore, would
benefit not only the drawer but also the acceptor bank. Profes-
sor Maccarone concludes:
Once the drawer has notified the acceptor of the fraud, the acceptor's
own obligation would enjoy the fraud exception for the reason I just
gave, i.e., that the defense does not arise from [their] personal rela-
tionship but from the instrument itself and therefore undermines the
right of the bad faith holder to obtain payment from any party to the
instrument. In sum, I believe that the Court was wrong in the case in
question stretching beyond reasonableness the abstraction of negotia-
ble instrument undertakings. 17 5
CONCLUSION
Even though the United States is not a party to the Geneva
Convention, its statutory law and, until Gotham and Banco
Bamerindus, its decisional law have been consistent with the
Convention's distinction between defenses against a payee or
first holder and a holder in due course. U.C.C. section 3-305,
which continues to be in force in New York, distinguishes be-
tween the defenses of "any party to the instrument with whom
the holder has not dealt," and, a contrario, those by a party
with whom the holder in due course has dealt.""6 White and
Summers note that, because U.C.C. section 3-305 permits a
holder to take free of defenses only of a party to the instrument
with whom the holder has not dealt with, most payees will not
174 Id.
175 Id.
170 U.C.C. section 3-305 as in force at the time of the Gothani and Banco Bamer-
indus decisions provides, in relevant part as follows:
To the extent that a holder is a holder in due course he takes the instrument
free from
(1) all claims to it on the part of any person; and
(2) all defenses of any party to the instrument with whom the holder
has not dealt except
(c) such misrepresentation as has induced the party to sign the instru-
ment with neither knowledge nor reasonable opportunity to obtain
knowledge of its character or its essential terms; ....
N.Y.U.C.C. § 3-305 (1991). One of this section's predecessors was section 58 of the Uni-
form Negotiable Instruments Law, which in relevant part stated: "In the hands of any
holder other than a holder in due course, a negotiable instrument is subject to the same
defenses as if it were non-negotiable .... Id. The Negotiable Instruments Law was
promulgated by the National Conference of Commissioners of Uniform State Laws in
1896, and by 1924 had been adopted, with minor variations, in all states.
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take free of the drawer's or maker's defenses. This is true "even
when these payees are holders in due course, for they Will have
dealt with the drawer or maker. In most cases, therefore, a payee
holder in due course will not enjoy the most significant advan-
tage accorded one in his shoes."' 77
It should be noted that the same court of appeals that de-
cided Gotham authored a landmark decision on defenses availa-
ble against a presumably fraudulent beneficiary approximately
seventy years earlier. In Maurice O'Meara Co v. National Park
Bank of New York ("O'Meara")178 the New York Court of Ap-
peals had to decide whether an issuing bank was justified in re-
fusing the beneficiary's sight drafts if the "paper, when deliv-
ered, did not correspond to what had been purchased in weight,
kind or quality. '179 The majority of the court of appeals decided
that whether the paper was what the purchaser contracted to
purchase did not concern the bank. The court stated that:
The bank was concerned only in the drafts and documents accompa-
nying them .... If the drafts, when presented, were accompanied by
the proper documents, then it was absolutely bound to make payment
under the letter of credit, irrespective of whether it knew, or had rea-
son to believe, that the paper was not of the tensile strength con-
tracted for... 180
As was his habit, Justice Cardozo engaged in a more
nuanced analysis than that of his peers. s18 In his dissent Cardozo
distinguished between the absence of a duty to inquire into
weight, kind or quality of goods and an absolute duty to pay
'77 See WHrIE & SuuhRmIs, supra note 69, at 636-37; see also Hall v. Westmoreland,
Hall & Bryan, 182 S.E.2d 539 (Ga. 1971); Riegert, supra note 85, at 141. U.C.C. section
3-305, as discussed in the text, is still in force in New York. See N.Y.U.CC. § 3-305
(McKinney 1991). The 1990 Official Text of the U.C.C., however, contains a substantially
changed (and not altogether clear) text of U.C.C. section 3-305. It would appear that
under the new text of section 3-305 a beneficiary who fraudulently induced a bank to
accept a draft may be subject to the signer-acceptor's defense of fraud granted by section
3-305(a)(1). Similarly, personal defenses between the drawee-obligor and the original
payee may be available under section 3-305(a)(3). Official Comment 2 to subsection
(a)(2) refers to these defenses as cut off by a holder in due course. Presumably, therefore
they are not cut off by an original payee or holder not in due course. Unfortunately, the
language used in the 1990 redrafting of many article 3 sections is so casuistic that the
proverbial forest is lost in the trees.
178 239 N.Y. 386, 146 N.E. 636 (1925).
179 Id. at 396, 614 N.E. at 639.
190 Id.
181 Id. (Cardozo, J., dissenting).
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when the bank knew or had reason to believe that the goods
were not of the kind, quality or weight represented by the bene-
ficiary. It simply did not follow from the absence of a duty of
concern with the merchandise that if the bank found that the
merchandise was not what the documents described, it was still
forced to pay "irrespective of its knowledge." 182 Rather than ar-
tificially inferring absolute duties from legalistic conceptions of
banking and commercial reality, Cardozo strived for an accurate
version of the transactional context, especially of the parties' re-
lationship. Hence, he concluded:
We are to bear in mind that this controversy is not between the bank
on one side and on the other a holder of the drafts who has taken
them without notice and for value. The controversy arises between the
bank and a seller who has misrepresented the security upon which
advances are demanded. Between parties so situated payment may be
resisted if the documents are false .... I think the conclusion is inevi-
table that a bank which pays a draft upon a bill of lading misrepre-
senting the character of the merchandise may recover the payment
when the misrepresentation is discovered .... If payment might have
been recovered the moment after it was made, the seller cannot coerce
payment if the truth is earlier revealed.18 3
Two public policies inhere in Justice Cardozo's conclusions.
The first is that courts must do their utmost to prevent or cor-
rect inequity, particularly the inequity that results from treating
unequals as equals. Second, courts must further procedural
economy. The manner in which this great jurist went about im-
plementing his public policies is educational for any adjudicator,
whether a judge, administrator or legislator. To bring about
equality of treatment, the adjudicator must first establish an ac-
curate transactional context, what Cardozo referred to as "the
true nature of the transaction,"' 84 to characterize the legal status
of the disputants. Once the transactional context and status of
the disputants is established, the adjudicator can determine
whether the rules in question are intended for such a dispute. A
rule that prevents the bank from raising fraud as a defense is
intended for the protection of a holder in due course and not for
a party that "deals" with the bank. The beneficiary, unlike a
holder in due course, "deals" with the bank when he receives





money from the bank in exchange for his tender of documents
representing that the goods are as described and allowing or in-
ducing the bank's reliance on its documents as collateral. The
beneficiary is protected by the principle of independence but
this protection is not given to the fraudulent beneficiary. A rule
that establishes priorities between acts of final payment or akin
to final payment and the "four legals" doctrine is intended to
protect the firming up of provisional settlements and the finality
of payment of collection items. It is not intended to protect
holders of unnegotiated and uncollected letter of credit drafts,
especially when the holder is presumably a fraudster. Finally,
procedural economy dictates that an adjudicator not decide the
matter before it in a manner inconsistent with its own inevitable
future decisions merely because the matter will be brought up in
a different procedural setting.
Cardozo's O'Meara dissenting opinion has withstood the
test of time. Section 5-114, perhaps the most invoked provision
in connection with current letter of credit litigation, bears the
imprint of Cardozo's O'Meara dissent.185 As demonstrated in the
preceding analysis, the context of the Banco Bamerindus and
Gotham time drafts (accepted or not as the draft in the latter
case may have been) is that of U.C.C. section 5-114. To reject
this rule is to ignore the true transactional context and to en-
courage the perpetration of inequity.
To reject section 5-114 also encourages costly procedural
duplication. If an egregious fraud allows recovery against the
same beneficiary by the same applicant or bank in a subsequent
proceeding, and if the harm could well be irreparable, there is no
justification to postpone. Conversely, if an adequate bonding re-
quirement ensures the recovery of good faith beneficiaries
against unwarranted injunctions, nothing justifies assuming that
I" See U.C.C. § 5-114 cmt. 2. During March 1960, while this writer was researching
his dissertation on comparative letter of credit law, he had occasion to visit with Karl
LLewellyn and Soia Mentschikoff at the University of Chicago Law School. During one
of these visits, Soia Mentschikoff indicated that Justice Shientag's opinion in Sztejn v.
Schroder Banking Corporation., 177 Misc. 719, 31 N.Y.S.2d 631 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County
1941) had been highly influential in the drafting of U.C.C. section 5-114. Yet when this
writer mentioned that Justice Shientag's ratio decidendi seemed to have been inspired
by Judge Cardozo's dissent in O'Meara Co. v. National Park Bank of New York, 239
N.Y. 386, 146 N.E. 636 (1925), Karl Llewellyn exclaimed: "Of course, who could doubt
that? Cardozo saw things earlier and better than the rest of them .... In many ways we
are all his children . .. ."
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beneficiaries are unprotected and denying injunctions against an
entire class of letters of credit drafts, i.e., those which have not
been negotiated.
To the extent that drafts held by beneficiaries or their col-
lecting agents are part of any market, such a market would still
be protected by U.C.C. section 5-114. Conversely, the unavaila-
bility of section 5-114 would undermine the market for New
York confirmations of foreign issuances. Consider the predica-
ment of a New York confirming bank in a Banco Bamerindus
type of situation: if it obeys New York and Second Circuit law,
as it must, it will risk losing reimbursement not only under the
laws of Brazil, but also of England, France, Germany and Italy,
among many others.
Gotham and Banco Bamerindus reinforce the existing
worldwide trend among confirming banks of requiring prepay-
ment or full collateralization of each confirmation. This trend
discourages the extension of credit among correspondent banks,
one of the most significant benefits of the correspondent bank-
ing relationship. In light of these considerations, the Second Cir-
cuit and the New York Court of Appeals, as well as other courts
that have followed Gotham and Banco Bamerindus, would be
well advised to reconsider their rejection of U.C.C. section 5-114.
Similarly, the National Conference of Commissioners of Uniform
State Laws, presently in the midst of revising article 5, should
make it a high priority to restore the vigor of section 5-114
(among other sections) by clarifying the interaction of article 5
with, among others, article 4.1s6
ise See Boris Kozolchyk, The Paperless Letter of Credit and Related Documents of
Title, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs. 39, 70-77 (1992).
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